Economic analysis has so far said little about how an individual's cognitive skills (CS) are related to the individual's economic preferences in different choice domains, such as risk taking or saving, and how preferences in different domains are related to each other. Using a sample of 1,000 trainee truckers we report three findings. First, there is a strong and significant relationship between an individual's CS and preferences. Individuals with better CS are more patient, in both short-and long-run. Better CS are also associated with a greater willingness to take calculated risks. Second, CS predict social awareness and choices in a sequential Prisoner's Dilemma game. Subjects with better CS more accurately forecast others' behavior and differentiate their behavior as a second mover more strongly depending on the first-mover's choice. Third, CS, and in particular, the ability to plan, strongly predict perseverance on the job in a setting with a substantial financial penalty for early exit. Consistent with CS being a common factor in all of these preferences and behaviors, we find a strong pattern of correlation among them. These results, taken together with the theoretical explanation we offer for the relationships we find, suggest that higher CS systematically affect preferences and choices in ways that favor economic success.cognitive ability ͉ discount rate ͉ Prisoner's Dilemma ͉ risk aversion ͉ turnover E conomic, financial, and many other decisions in life require choosing between options that vary along several distinct dimensions, such as the probability or the delivery times of the outcomes. Variation in these factors affects the choices of different individuals differently; for example, some people are more prudent in risk taking, whereas others are more patient in their choices of saving versus consumption. Individuals also vary in their cognitive skills (CS). Economists have only recently begun to analyze how the general CS of an individual might be related to that individual's economic preferences and whether and how the preferences of the same individual in different choice domains, such as risk taking or saving, might be related to each other (1-5). Psychologists have studied the relationship between various CS and job success, among other outcome variables, but without focusing on the link between CS and preferences (6). Similarly, little is known about how CS influence behavior in strategic interactions. However, an understanding of the effects CS may have on preferences (7) and strategic behavior, and the relations that may exist among preferences, is of considerable potential importance in constructing theories of human decision making and in selecting managerial and public policies.We examine whether and how CS are related to attitudes toward risk and intertemporal choices and how choices in these distinct domains are related to each other in a large sample (n ϭ 1,066) of trainee tractor-trailer drivers at a sizable U.S. trucking company (see SI Appendix and ref. 8). We also examine how CS ...
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Workers' wages are not set in a spot market. Instead, the wages of most workers-at least those who do not switch jobs-typically change only annually and are mediated by a complex set of institutions and factors such as contracts, unions, standards of fairness, minimum wage policy, transfers of risk, and incomplete information. The goal of the International Wage Flexibility Project (IWFP)-a consortium of over 40 researchers with access to individual workers' earnings data for 16 countries-is to provide new microeconomic evidence on how wages change for continuing workers. Wage changes due to worker mobility are governed by different processes and are beyond the scope of this study.A key question in the theoretical and empirical literature, as reviewed in
The exact cause of the massive defaults and foreclosures in the U.S. subprime mortgage market is still unclear. This paper investigates whether a particular aspect of borrowers' financial literacy-their numerical ability-may have played a role. We measure several aspects of financial literacy and cognitive ability in a survey of subprime mortgage borrowers who took out mortgages in 2006 or 2007 and match these measures to objective data on mortgage characteristics and repayment performance. We find a large and statistically significant negative correlation between numerical ability and various measures of delinquency and default. Foreclosure starts are approximately two-thirds lower in the group with the highest measured level of numerical ability compared with the group with the lowest measured level. The result is robust to controlling for a broad set of sociodemographic variables and not driven by other aspects of cognitive ability or the characteristics of the mortgage contracts. Our results raise the possibility that limitations in certain aspects of financial literacy played an important role in the subprime mortgage crisis.
Evidence from both psychology and economics indicates that individuals give statements that appear to overestimate their ability compared to that of others. We test three theories that predict such relative overconfidence. The first theory argues that overconfidence can be generated by Bayesian updating from a common prior and truthful statements if individuals do not know their true type. The second theory suggests that self-image concerns asymmetrically affect the choice to receive new information about one's abilities, and this asymmetry can produce overconfidence. The third theory is that overconfidence is induced by the desire to send positive signals to others about one's own skill; this suggests either a bias in judgment, strategic lying, or both. We formulate this theory precisely. Using a large data set of relative ability judgments about two cognitive tests, we reject the restrictions imposed by the Bayesian model and also reject a key prediction of the self-image models that individuals with optimistic beliefs will be less likely to search for further information about their skill because this information might shatter their self-image. We provide evidence that personality traits strongly affect relative ability judgments in a pattern that is consistent with the third theory of social signaling. Our results together suggest that overconfidence in statements is more likely to be induced by social concerns than by either of the other two factors.
Abstract:In this paper, we argue that important labor market phenomena can be better understood if one takes (i) the inherent incompleteness and relational nature of most employment contracts and (ii) the existence of reference-dependent fairness concerns among a substantial share of the population into account. Theory shows and experiments confirm, that even if fairness concerns were only to exert weak effects in one-shot interactions, repeated interactions greatly magnify the relevance of such concerns on economic outcomes. We also review evidence from laboratory and field experiments examining the role of wages and fairness on effort, derive predictions from our approach for entry-level wages and incumbent workers' wages, confront these predictions with the evidence, and show that referencedependent fairness concerns may have important consequences for the effects of economic policies such as minimum wage laws.* We are very grateful to valuable comments received from
Unprecedented levels of US subprime mortgage defaults precipitated a severe global financial crisis in late 2008, plunging much of the industrialized world into a deep recession. However, the fundamental reasons for why US mortgages defaulted at such spectacular rates remain largely unknown. This paper presents empirical evidence showing that the ability to perform basic mathematical calculations is negatively associated with the propensity to default on one’s mortgage. We measure several aspects of financial literacy and cognitive ability in a survey of subprime mortgage borrowers who took out loans in 2006 and 2007, and match them to objective, detailed administrative data on mortgage characteristics and payment histories. The relationship between numerical ability and mortgage default is robust to controlling for a broad set of sociodemographic variables, and is not driven by other aspects of cognitive ability. We find no support for the hypothesis that numerical ability impacts mortgage outcomes through the choice of the mortgage contract. Rather, our results suggest that individuals with limited numerical ability default on their mortgage due to behavior unrelated to the initial choice of their mortgage.
We analyze the bidding behavior of expectations-based loss-averse bidders in auctions with interdependent values. We emphasize the difference between the risk bidders face over whether they win the auction (extensive risk) and the risk they face over the value of the prize conditional on winning (intensive risk). The extensive risk creates an "attachment" effect, whereas the intensive risk operates via a "comparison" effect. How loss-averse bidders react to these different risks depends on whether they incorporate their bid into their reference point. Under "unacclimating personal equilibrium" (UPE), where bidders keep their expectations fixed when choosing their bids, both the extensive and intensive risks induce them to bid more aggressively. Moreover, bidders are exposed to the "winner's curse" and a seller can attain higher revenue by hiding information in order to leverage the intensive risk. By contrast, under "choice-acclimating personal equilibrium" (CPE), where a bid determines both the reference lottery and the outcome lottery, the intensive risk creates a "precautionary bidding" effect that pushes bidders to behave less aggressively; whether this effect is reinforced or undermined by the extensive risk depends on a bidder's likelihood of winning the auction. Furthermore, bidders are less aggressive than under UPE and can be subject to a "loser's curse." Yet, by committing to bidding less aggressively, such as by engaging in proxy bidding, loss-averse bidders are better off under CPE than UPE.
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