Humans and other vertebrates occasionally show a preference for items remembered to be costly or experienced when the subject was in a poor condition (this is known as a sunk-costs fallacy or state-dependent valuation). Whether these mechanisms shared across vertebrates are the result of convergence toward an adaptive solution or evolutionary relicts reflecting common ancestral traits is unknown. Here we show that state-dependent valuation also occurs in an invertebrate, the desert locust Schistocerca gregaria (Orthoptera: Acrididae). Given the latter's phylogenetic and neurobiological distance from those groups in which the phenomenon was already known, we suggest that state-dependent valuation mechanisms are probably ecologically rational solutions to widespread problems of choice.
Normative models of choice in economics and biology usually expect preferences to be consistent across contexts, or “rational” in economic language. Following a large body of literature reporting economically irrational behaviour in humans, breaches of rationality by animals have also been recently described. If proven systematic, these findings would challenge long-standing biological approaches to behavioural theorising, and suggest that cognitive processes similar to those claimed to cause irrationality in humans can also hinder optimality approaches to modelling animal preferences. Critical differences between human and animal experiments have not, however, been sufficiently acknowledged. While humans can be instructed conceptually about the choice problem, animals need to be trained by repeated exposure to all contingencies. This exposure often leads to differences in state between treatments, hence changing choices while preserving rationality. We report experiments with European starlings demonstrating that apparent breaches of rationality can result from state-dependence. We show that adding an inferior alternative to a choice set (a “decoy”) affects choices, an effect previously interpreted as indicating irrationality. However, these effects appear and disappear depending on whether state differences between choice contexts are present or not. These results open the possibility that some expressions of maladaptive behaviour are due to oversights in the migration of ideas between economics and biology, and suggest that key differences between human and nonhuman research must be recognised if ideas are to safely travel between these fields.
A core problem of decision theories is that although decisionmakers' preferences depend on learning, their choices could be driven either by learned representations of the physical properties of each alternative (for instance reward sizes) or of the benefit (utility and fitness) experienced from them. Physical properties are independent of the subject's state and context, but utility depends on both. We show that starlings' choices are better explained by memory for context-dependent utility than by representations of the alternatives' physical properties, even when the decisionmakers' state is controlled and they have accurate knowledge about the options' physical properties. Our results support the potential universality of utility-driven preference control.state-dependent preferences | rationality | starling | optimal foraging | decision-making
Brood parasitism imposes several fitness costs on the host species. To reduce these costs, hosts of avian brood parasites have evolved various defenses, of which egg rejection is the most prevalent. In the face of variable host-parasite mimicry and the costs of egg discrimination itself, many hosts reject only some foreign eggs. Here, we experimentally varied the recognition cues to study the underlying cognitive mechanisms used by the Chalk-browed Mockingbird (Mimus saturninus) to reject the white immaculate eggs laid by the parasitic Shiny Cowbird (Molothrus bonariensis). Immaculate eggs are the only parasite eggs rejected by this host, as it accepts all polymorphic, spotted eggs laid by cowbirds. Using a within-breeding pair experimental design, we tested for the salience of spotting, UV reflectance, and brightness in eliciting rejection. We found that the presence of spotting significantly decreased the probability of rejection while increments in brightness significantly increased rejection frequencies. The cognitive rules underlying mockingbird rejection behavior can be explained by a decision-making model which predicts changes in the levels of rejection in direct relation to the number of relevant attributes shared between host and parasite eggs.
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