In Becker's (1973) neoclassical marriage market model, matching is positively assortaive if types are complements: i.e., match output f(x, y) is supermodular in x and y. We reprise this famous result assuming time‐intensive partner search and transferable output. We prove existence of a search equilibrium with a continuum of types, and then characterize matching. After showing that Becker's conditions on match output no longer suffice for assortative matching, we find sufficient conditions valid for any search frictions and type distribution: supermodularity not only of output f, but also of log fx and log fxy. Symmetric submodularity conditions imply negatively assortative matching. Examples show these conditions are necessary.
We introduce and solve a new class of "downward-recursive" static portfolio choice problems. An individual simultaneously chooses among ranked stochastic options, and each choice is costly. In the motivational application, just one may be exercised from those that succeed. This often emerges in practice, such as when a student applies to many colleges or when a firm simultaneously tries several technologies. Copyright The Econometric Society 2006.
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