The normal variability in alertness we experience in daily tasks is rarely taking into account in cognitive neuroscience. Here we studied neurobehavioral dynamics of cognitive control with decreasing alertness. We used the classic Simon Task where participants hear the word "left" or "right" in the right or left ear, eliciting slower responses when the word and the side are incongruent -the conflict effect. Participants performed the task both while fully awake and while getting drowsy, allowing for the characterisation of alertness modulating cognitive control. The changes in the neural signatures of conflict from local theta oscillations to a longdistance distributed theta network suggests a reconfiguration of the underlying neural processes subserving cognitive control when affected by alertness fluctuations.

We report the results of an academic survey into the theoretical and methodological foundations, common assumptions and the current state of the field of consciousness science. The survey consisted of 22 questions, was distributed online and at two different occasions of the annual meeting of the Association of the Scientific Study of Consciousness (ASSC, 2018 and 2019), targeting active scientists in the field only. We examined responses from 232 consciousness scientists with different backgrounds (e.g., philosophy, neuroscience, psychology, computer science) and at various stages of their careers (e.g., junior/senior faculty, graduate/undergraduate students). The results reveal that while respondents answer related questions quite consistently, there remains considerable discussion and debate between researchers about the definition of consciousness and the way it should be studied. To highlight a few observations, a majority of respondents believe that machines could have consciousness, that consciousness is a gradual phenomenon in the animal kingdom and that unconscious processing is extensive, encompassing both low-level as well as high-level cognitive functions. Further, we show which theories of consciousness are currently considered most promising and how supposedly different theories cluster together, which dependent measures are best used to index the presence or absence of consciousness, and which neural measures are the most likely signatures of consciousness. These findings provide us with a snapshot of the current, dominant views of professional researchers in the field and therefore may help to prioritise research and theoretical approaches to foster progress.

We report the results of an academic survey into the theoretical and methodological foundations, common assumptions, and the current state of the field of consciousness research. The survey consisted of 22 questions and was distributed on two different occasions of the annual meeting of the Association of the Scientific Study of Consciousness (2018 and 2019). We examined responses from 166 consciousness researchers with different backgrounds (e.g. philosophy, neuroscience, psychology, and computer science) and at various stages of their careers (e.g. junior/senior faculty and graduate/undergraduate students). The results reveal that there remains considerable discussion and debate between the surveyed researchers about the definition of consciousness and the way it should be studied. To highlight a few observations, a majority of respondents believe that machines could have consciousness, that consciousness is a gradual phenomenon in the animal kingdom, and that unconscious processing is extensive, encompassing both low-level and high-level cognitive functions. Further, we show which theories of consciousness are currently considered most promising by respondents and how supposedly different theories cluster together, which dependent measures are considered best to index the presence or absence of consciousness, and which neural measures are thought to be the most likely signatures of consciousness. These findings provide us with a snapshot of the current views of researchers in the field and may therefore help prioritize research and theoretical approaches to foster progress.

In the search for the neural basis of conscious experience, perception and its cognitive consequences are typically confounded as neural activity is recorded while participants explicitly report what they experience. Here we present a novel way to disentangle perception from report using eye-movement analysis techniques based on convolutional neural networks and neurodynamical analyses based on information theory. We use a visual bistable stimulus that instantiates two well-known properties of conscious perception: integration and differentiation. At any given moment, observers either experience the stimulus as one integrated unitary percept or as two differentiated objects that are clearly distinct from each other. Using electroencephalography, we show that measures of neural information dynamics of directed information integration and differentiation closely follow participants experience when perceptual transitions were reported. We observed increased directed information from anterior to posterior electrodes (front to back) leading up to the moment the stimulus was reported to switch to the integrated percept and higher information differentiation of anterior signals leading up to reporting the differentiated percept. Crucially, neural integration dynamics were closely linked to perception and even observed in a no-report condition when perceptual transitions were inferred from eye-movements. In contrast, the link between perceptual transitions and neural differentiation was observed solely in the active report condition. Our results therefore suggest a differential role of anterior-posterior network communication vs anterior information differentiation during perception and reporting: while front to back directed information is associated with changes in the content of perception, frontal information differentiation reflects cognitive processes that are consequential of perceptual transitions, not perception per se.

Conflict detection in sensory input is central to adaptive human behavior. Perhaps unsurprisingly, past research has shown that conflict may even be detected in absence of conflict awareness, suggesting that conflict detection is an automatic process that does not require attention. To test the possibility of conflict processing in the absence of attention, we manipulated task relevance and response overlap of potentially conflicting stimulus features across six behavioral tasks. Multivariate analyses on human electroencephalographic data revealed neural signatures of conflict only when at least one feature of a conflicting stimulus was attended, regardless of whether that feature was part of the conflict, or overlaps with the response. In contrast, neural signatures of basic sensory processes were present even when a stimulus was completely unattended. These data reveal an attentional bottleneck at the level of objects, suggesting that object-based attention is a prerequisite for cognitive control operations involved in conflict detection.

18Humans are remarkably capable of adapting their behaviour flexibly based on rapid situational 19 changes: a capacity termed cognitive control. Intuitively, cognitive control is thought to be affected by 20 the state of alertness, for example, when sleepy or drowsy, we feel less capable of adequately 21implementing effortful cognitive tasks. Although scientific investigations have focused on the effects 22 of sleep deprivation and circadian time, little is known about how natural fluctuations in alertness in 23 the regular awake state affect cognitive control. Here we combined a conflict task in the auditory 24 domain with neurodynamics -EEG recordings-to test how neural and behavioural markers of conflict 25processing are affected by fluctuations in arousal. Using a novel computational method, we 26 segregated alert and drowsy trials from a three hour testing session and observed that, although 27 participants were generally slower, the typical slower responses to conflicting information, compared 28to non-conflicting information, was still intact, as well as the effect of previous trials (i.e. conflict 29 adaptation). However, the behaviour was not matched by the typical neural markers of cognitive 30control -local medio-frontal theta-band power changes-, that participants showed during full alertness. 31Instead, a decrease in power of medio-frontal theta was accompanied by an increase in long-range 32 information sharing (connectivity) between brain regions in the same frequency band. The results 33show the resilience of the human cognitive control system when affected by internal fluctuations of 34 our arousal state and suggests a neural compensatory mechanism when the system is under 35physiological pressure due to diminished alertness. 36

Conflict detection in sensory input is central to adaptive human behavior. Perhaps unsurprisingly, past research has shown that conflict may be detected even in the absence of conflict awareness, suggesting that conflict detection is a fully automatic process that does not require attention. Across six behavioral tasks, we manipulated task relevance and response overlap of potentially conflicting stimulus features to test the possibility of conflict processing in the absence of attention. Multivariate analyses on human electroencephalographic data revealed that neural signatures of conflict are only present when at least one feature of a conflicting stimulus is attended, regardless of whether that feature is part of the conflict. In contrast, neural signatures of basic sensory processes are present even when a stimulus is completely unattended. These data reveal an attentional bottleneck at the level of objects, suggesting that object-based attention is a prerequisite for cognitive control operations involved in conflict detection.

In the search for the neural basis of conscious experience, perception and the cognitive processes associated with reporting perception are typically confounded as neural activity is recorded while participants explicitly report what they experience. Here, we present a novel way to disentangle perception from report using eye movement analysis techniques based on convolutional neural networks and neurodynamical analyses based on information theory. We use a bistable visual stimulus that instantiates two well-known properties of conscious perception: integration and differentiation. At any given moment, observers either perceive the stimulus as one integrated unitary object or as two differentiated objects that are clearly distinct from each other. Using electroencephalography, we show that measures of integration and differentiation based on information theory closely follow participants’ perceptual experience of those contents when switches were reported. We observed increased information integration between anterior to posterior electrodes (front to back) prior to a switch to the integrated percept, and higher information differentiation of anterior signals leading up to reporting the differentiated percept. Crucially, information integration was closely linked to perception and even observed in a no-report condition when perceptual transitions were inferred from eye movements alone. In contrast, the link between neural differentiation and perception was observed solely in the active report condition. Our results, therefore, suggest that perception and the processes associated with report require distinct amounts of anterior–posterior network communication and anterior information differentiation. While front-to-back directed information is associated with changes in the content of perception when viewing bistable visual stimuli, regardless of report, frontal information differentiation was absent in the no-report condition and therefore is not directly linked to perception per se.