Theoretical approaches to understanding student engagement with assessment and feedback are increasingly emphasising the importance of dialogue in recognition that learning tacit knowledge is an active, shared process. This paper evaluates an experimental approach to providing feedback which was designed to create a dialogue between tutor and student without additional work for staff. Tutors on an outdoor studies degree attempted to set up a dialogue with students by providing written feedback in response to students' questions about their work, requested on their assignment cover sheets. Data were collected in the form of their feedback questions, interviews with students and a focus group of staff. The data indicate that the approach encouraged students to think about their writing but that students' limited understanding of staff expectations and standards limits their ability to initiate a meaningful dialogue with their tutors. More positively, the research suggests that if staff capitalise on and develop existing peer discussion of assessment, it may provide an important foundation for the greater challenge of entering into a dialogue with academic staff.

This article analyses how the monies generated for, and from, corporate financial crimes are controlled, concealed, and converted through the use of organisational structures in the form of otherwise legitimate corporate entities and arrangements that serve as vehicles for the management of illicit finances. Unlike the illicit markets and associated 'organised crime groups' and 'criminal enterprises' that are the normal focus of money laundering studies, corporate financial crimes involve ostensibly legitimate businesses operating within licit, transnational markets. Within these scenarios, we see corporations as primary offenders, as agents, and as facilitators of the administration of illicit finances. In all cases, organisational structures provide opportunities for managing illicit finances that individuals alone cannot access, but which require some element of third-party collaboration. In this article, we draw on data generated from our Partnership for Conflict, Crime, and Security Research (PaCCS)-funded project on the misuse of corporate structures and entities to manage illicit finances to make a methodological and substantive addition to the literature in this area. We analyse two cases from our research-corporate bribery in international business and corporate tax fraud-before discussing three main findings: (1) the ostensible legitimacy created through abuse of otherwise lawful business arrangements; (2) the effective anonymity and insulation afforded through such misuse; and (3) the necessity for facilitation by third-party professionals operating within a stratified market. The analysis improves our understanding of how and why business offenders misuse what are otherwise legitimate business structures, arrangements, and practices in their criminal enterprise.

This article analyses the market dynamics of the misuse of ‘corporate vehicles’ in the management of finances generated from, and for, organized, white-collar and corporate crimes. The term ‘corporate vehicles’ is a policy construct used to refer to legitimate, legal structures, like trusts and companies, that facilitate a range of commercial activities. Such vehicles also provide opportunities for those involved in serious crimes for gain to control, convert and conceal their illicit finances, usually with the assistance of professional intermediaries, such as lawyers or financial advisors. This article empirically investigates key market features (actors/providers, commodities/products, services) and conditions (supply, demand, regulation, competition), with particular focus on professional intermediaries and how they facilitate the control of other people’s dirty money.

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