Prior research demonstrates that understanding of theory of mind develops at different paces in children raised in different cultures. Are these differences simply differences in timing, or do they represent different patterns of cultural learning? That is, to what extent are sequences of theory-of-mind understanding universal, and to what extent are they culture-specific? We addressed these questions by using a theory-of-mind scale to examine performance of 140 Chinese children living in Beijing and to compare their performance with that of 135 English-speaking children living in the United States and Australia. Results reveal a common sequence of understanding, as well as sociocultural differences in children's developing theories of mind.

Abstract. Can children reason the Bayesian way? We argue that the answer to this question depends on how numbers are represented, because a representation can do part of the computation. We test, for the fi rst time, whether Bayesian reasoning can be elicited in children by means of natural frequencies. We show that when information was presented to fourth, fi fth, and sixth graders in terms of probabilities, their ability to estimate the Bayesian posterior probability was zero. Yet when the same information was presented in natural frequencies, Bayesian reasoning showed a steady increase from fourth to sixth grade, reaching an average level of 19%, 39%, and 53%, respectively, in two studies. Sixth graders' performance with natural frequencies matched the performance of adults with probabilities. But this general increase was accompanied by striking individual diff erences. More than half of the sixth graders solved most or all problems, whereas one third could not solve a single one. An analysis of the children's responses provides evidence for the use of three non-Bayesian strategies. Th ese follow an overlapping wave model of development and continue to be observed in the minds of adults. More so than adults' probabilistic reasoning, children's reasoning depends on a proper representation of information.

The findings show a clear association between alcohol outlet density and violence, and suggest that the issues of alcohol availability and access are fundamental to the prevention of alcohol-related problems within communities.

This study investigated the motivational and social-cognitive foundations (i.e., inequality aversion, in-group bias, and theory of mind) that underlie the development of sharing behavior among 3- to 9-year-old Chinese children (N = 122). Each child played two mini-dictator games against an in-group member (friend) and an out-group member (stranger) to divide four stickers. Results indicated that there was a small to moderate age-related increase in children's egalitarian sharing with strangers, whereas the age effect was moderate to large in interactions with friends. Moreover, 3- to 4-year-olds did not treat strangers and friends differently, but 5- to 6-year-old and older children showed strong in-group favoritism. Finally, theory of mind was an essential prerequisite for children's sharing behavior toward strangers, but not a unique predictor of their sharing with friends.

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