Many of society's most significant social decisions are made over sets of individuals: for example, evaluating a collection of job candidates when making a hiring decision. Rational theories of choice dictate that decision makers' preferences between any two options should remain the same irrespective of the number or quality of other options. Yet people's preferences for each option in a choice set shift in predictable ways as function of the available alternatives. These violations are well documented in consumer behavior contexts: for example, the decoy effect, in which introducing a third inferior product changes consumers' preferences for two original products. The current experiments test the efficacy of social decoys and harness insights from computational models of decision-making to examine whether choice set construction can be used to change preferences in a hiring context. Across seven experiments (N = 6312) we find that participants have systematically different preferences for the exact same candidate as a function of the other candidates in the choice set (Experiments 1a-1d, 2) and the salience of the candidate attributes under consideration (Experiments 2, 3a, 3b). Specifically, compromise and (often) asymmetric-dominance decoys increased relative preference for their yoked candidates when candidates were counterstereotypical (e.g., high warmth/low competence male candidate). More importantly, we demonstrate for the first time that we can mimic the effect of a decoy in the absence of a third candidate by manipulating participants' exposure to candidates' attributes: balanced exposure to candidates' warmth and competence information significantly reduced bias between the two candidates. (PsycINFO Database Record
Decision-makers consistently exhibit violations of rational choice theory when they choose among several alternatives in a set (e.g., failing to buy the best product in a set when it is presented alongside high-quality alternatives). Many of society's most significant social decisions similarly involve the joint evaluation of multiple candidates. Are social decisions subject to the same violations, and if so, what account best characterizes the nature of the violations? Across five studies, we tested whether decision-makers exhibit context-dependent preferences in hiring scenarios and past U.S. congressional race outcomes and compared different models of value coding as sources of the hypothesized context-dependence. Studies 1a, 1b, and 1d revealed that a divisive normalization value coding scheme best characterized participants' choices across a series of hiring decisions, and that participants exhibited contextdependent preferences. However, the distractor had the opposite effect of that predicted by divisive normalization once we accounted for the random effect of participant: as the value of the distractor increased, participants were more likely to hire the highest-valued candidate. In Study 2, we used a combination of archival electoral data and survey data to examine whether normalization models could explain the outcomes of congressional elections. Electoral outcomes were predicted by political candidates' inferred competence, but this time in line with the divisive normalization account. Our findings offer mixed support for a formal, neurobiologically-derived account of when and how specific alternatives exert their effects on social evaluation and choice and highlight conditions under which high-value distractors increase versus decrease relative choice accuracy.
Many of society's most significant social decisions are made over sets of individuals: for example, evaluating a collection of job candidates when making a hiring decision. Rational theories of choice dictate that decision makers' preferences between any two options should remain the same irrespective of the number or quality of other options. Yet people's preferences for each option in a choice set shift in predictable ways as function of the available alternatives. These violations are well documented in consumer behavior contexts: for example, the decoy effect, in which introducing a third inferior product changes consumers' preferences for two original products. The current experiments test the efficacy of social decoys and harness insights from computational models of decision-making to examine whether choice set construction can be used to change preferences in a hiring context. Across seven experiments (N = 6312) we find that participants have systematically different preferences for the exact same candidate as a function of the other candidates in the choice set (Experiments 1a-1d, 2) and the salience of the candidate attributes under consideration (Experiments 2, 3a, 3b). Specifically, compromise and (often) asymmetric-dominance decoys increased relative preference for their yoked candidates when candidates were counter-stereotypical (e.g., high warmth/low competence male candidate). More importantly, we demonstrate for the first time that we can mimic the effect of a decoy in the absence of a third candidate by manipulating participants' exposure to candidates' attributes: balanced exposure to candidates' warmth and competence information significantly reduced bias between the two candidates.
Social evaluative abilities emerge in human infancy, highlighting their importance in shaping our species' early understanding of the social world. Remarkably, infants show social evaluation in relatively abstract contexts: for instance, preferring a wooden shape that helps another shape in a puppet show over a shape that hinders another character (Hamlin et al., 2007 ). Here we ask whether these abstract social evaluative abilities are shared with other species. Domestic dogs provide an ideal animal species in which to address this question because this species cooperates extensively with conspecifics and humans and may thus benefit from a more general ability to socially evaluate prospective partners. We tested dogs on a social evaluation puppet show task originally used with human infants. Subjects watched a helpful shape aid an agent in achieving its goal and a hinderer shape prevent an agent from achieving its goal. We examined (1) whether dogs showed a preference for the helpful or hinderer shape, (2) whether dogs exhibited longer exploration of the helpful or hinderer shape, and (3) whether dogs were more likely to engage with their handlers during the helper or hinderer events. In contrast to human infants, dogs showed no preference for either the helper or the hinderer, nor were they more likely to engage with their handlers during helper or hinderer events. Dogs did spend more time exploring the hindering shape, perhaps indicating that they were puzzled by the agent's unhelpful behavior. However, this preference was moderated by a preference for one of the two shapes, regardless of role. These findings suggest that, relative to infants, dogs show weak or absent social evaluative abilities when presented with abstract events and point to constraints on dogs' abilities to evaluate others' behavior.
Decision-makers consistently exhibit violations of rational choice theory when they choose among several alternatives in a set (e.g., failing to buy the best product in a set when it is presented alongside high-quality alternatives). Many of society’s most significant social decisions similarly involve the joint evaluation of multiple candidates. Are social decisions subject to the same violations, and if so, what account best characterizes the nature of the violations? Across five studies, we tested whether decision-makers exhibit context-dependent preferences in hiring scenarios and past U.S. congressional race outcomes and co¬mpared different models of value coding as sources of the hypothesized context-dependence. Studies 1a, 1b, and 1d revealed that a divisive normalization value coding scheme best characterized participants’ choices across a series of hiring decisions, and that participants exhibited context-dependent preferences. However, the distractor had the opposite effect of that predicted by divisive normalization once we accounted for the random effect of participant: as the value of the distractor increased, participants were more likely to hire the highest-valued candidate. In Study 2, we used a combination of archival electoral data and survey data to examine whether normalization models could explain the outcomes of congressional elections. Electoral outcomes were predicted by political candidates’ inferred competence, but this time in line with the divisive normalization account. Our findings offer mixed support for a formal, neurobiologically-derived account of when and how specific alternatives exert their effects on social evaluation and choice and highlight conditions under which high-value distractors increase versus decrease relative choice accuracy.
It has been suggested that over the course of domestication, dogs developed the propensity to “look back” or gaze at humans when they encounter a challenging task. Unfortunately, little work to date has addressed the question of why dogs look back. To explore this issue, we conducted 3 experiments in which dogs had the option of doing something other than looking back at their owner when encountering an unsolvable task. In Experiments 1 and 2, dogs could look back or attempt an alternative puzzle. In both experiments, dogs attempted the alternative puzzle prior to looking back. In Experiment 3, when dogs encountered the unsolvable task, they could look back or attempt to solve the same puzzle using an alternate approach. As in Experiments 1 and 2, dogs attempted the alternate approach prior to looking back. Although some scholars have suggested that dogs may look back because they are overly reliant on humans, our findings suggest that dogs may instead prioritize independent exploration over looking back.
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