In this study, we document evidence on the relation between auditor tenure and earnings quality using the dispersion and sign of both absolute Jones-model abnormal accruals and absolute current accruals as proxies for earnings quality. Our study is motivated by calls for “mandatory auditor rotation,” which are based on concerns that longer auditor tenure reduces earnings quality. Multivariate results, controlling for firm age, size, industry growth, cash flows, auditor type (Big N versus non-Big N), industry, and year, generally suggest higher earnings quality with longer auditor tenure. We interpret our results as suggesting that, in the current environment, longer auditor tenure, on average, results in auditors placing greater constraints on extreme management decisions in the reporting of financial performance.

This paper studies how firm disclosure activity affects the relation between current annual stock returns, contemporaneous annual earnings and future earnings. Our results show that firms with relatively more informative disclosures “bring the future forward” so that current returns reflect more future earnings news. We also find that changes in disclosure activity are positively related to changes in the importance of future earnings news for current returns. These results suggest that a firm’s disclosure activity reveals credible, relevant information not in current earnings, and that this information is incorporated into the current stock price.

Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) comment letters provide independent and timely feedback on the clarity of disclosures and on the extent to which filings comply with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles and SEC reporting regulations. We investigate factors that affect the probability of receiving a 10-K comment letter, the extent of comments received, and the cost of remediation. We find that in addition to factors explicitly stated to increase SEC scrutiny in Section 408 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, low profitability, high complexity, engaging a small audit firm, and weaknesses in governance are positively associated with the receipt of a comment letter, the extent of comments, and the cost of remediation. The probability that the comment letter results in a restatement is higher for smaller companies and for companies engaging a small audit firm. We also provide evidence that comments relating to accounting issues result in higher remediation costs, largely due to the additional time required to resolve comments relating to classification issues and fair value issues. Our findings should be of interest to stakeholders who use SEC comment letters to assess disclosure quality and reporting compliance, and to managers and other stakeholders impacted by costs associated with the SEC's review process. Data Availability All data used in the study are publicly available from the sources cited in the text.

We examine whether three tax system characteristics—required book-tax conformity, worldwide versus territorial approach, and perceived strength of enforcement—impact corporate tax avoidance across countries after controlling for firm-specific factors previously shown to be associated with tax avoidance (i.e., performance, size, operating costs, leverage, growth, the presence of multinational operations, and industry) and for other cross-country factors (i.e., statutory corporate tax rates, earnings volatility, and institutional factors). We find that, on average, firms avoid taxes less when required book-tax conformity is higher, a worldwide approach is used, and tax enforcement is perceived to be stronger. However, the relations between tax avoidance and all three tax systems characteristics are contextual and depend on the extent to which management compensation comes from variable pay, including bonuses, stock awards, and stock options. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the text.

This paper provides evidence on firms that report long “strings” of consecutive increases in earnings per share (EPS). First, we find 746 firms that report earnings strings of at least twenty quarters since 1962, and show that this frequency is much larger than would be expected by chance. We interpret this as prima facie evidence of earnings management. Next, we document that these firms enjoy abnormal returns that average more than 20 percent per year during the first five years of these strings, and these returns are larger than those of firms reporting at least five years of consecutive increases in annual (but not quarterly) EPS. We argue that these market premia, and the rapidity with which they disappear once the strings end, provide managers with incentives to maintain and extend the strings. Finally, we present several tests that document how managers of these firms use various earnings management tools to help their firms sustain and extend these strings.