Fewer women than men become executive managers. They earn less over their careers, hold more junior positions, and exit the occupation at a faster rate. We compiled a large panel data set on executives and formed a career hierarchy to analyze mobility and compensation rates. We …nd that, controlling for executive rank and background, women earn higher compensation than men, experience more income uncertainty, and are promoted more quickly. Amongst survivors, being female increases the chance of becoming CEO. Hence, the unconditional gender pay gap and job-rank di¤erences are primarily attributable to female executives exiting at higher rates than men in an occupation where survival is rewarded with promotion and higher compensation.

This paper investigates the role of labor-market attachment, on-thejob human-capital accumulation, occupational sorting, and discrimination in the narrowing gender earnings gap from 1968-93. This paper contributes in three ways: First, it formulates an estimable dynamic model of labor-supply, occupational sorting and human-capital accumulation in which gender discrimination and the earnings gap arise endogenously. Second, it demonstrates identi cation of such models and develops a three-step estimation technique. Third, it uses the framework to quantify the main driving forces behind the changes in labor-market gender patterns. Increase in overall productivity, demographic changes and statistical discrimination patterns account for a large percentage of the decline in the gender earnings gap and the increase in female labor market experience. Whereas, relative increase in productivity in professional occupations raise representation of women in professional occupations. Further analysis shows that labor-market frictions signi cantly amplify exogenous changes in our model. Without labor-market frictions, the earnings gap would have been smaller by at least 45%. Fewer women would have participated in the labor force, but those who participated would have worked more and earned incomes similar to those of men. We nd that there are signi cantly higher returns to professional occupations and that this has increased greatly over time, accounting for women's increasing representation in professional occupations.

This paper analyzes the sources of the racial difference in the intergenerational transmission of human capital by developing and estimating a dynastic model of parental time and monetary inputs in early childhood with endogenous fertility, home hours, labor supply, marriage, and divorce. It finds that the racial differences in the marriage matching patterns lead to racial differences in labor supply and home hours of couples. Although both the black-white labor market earnings and marriage market gaps are important sources of the black-white achievement gap, the assortative mating and divorce probabilities racial gaps accounts for a larger fraction of it.

This paper considers the effect of offer matching on labor market outcomes when the current employer has better information about his worker's productivity than potential employers. Previous research found that when current employers have better information than potential employers, the later use job assignment to infer an employed worker's qualifications. As a result, assignment of workers to jobs is inefficient. I find that when current employers can match outside offers the equilibrium outcome may be efficient despite the asymmetric information. I then analyze the effect of the asymmetric information on investment in human capital made by employers and workers, and find these investment levels to be first best.