&dquo;which provides services, assistance, and other activities of sufficient scope and size to give promise of progress toward elimination of poverty...through developing employment opportunities, improving human performance, motivation, and productivity, or bettering the conditions under which people live, learn, and work;&dquo; (3) &dquo;which is developed, conducted, and administered with the maximum feasible participation of residents of the areas and members of the groups served. &dquo; (emphasis added)Since the passage of the act, the last of these elements--the clause which calls for &dquo;maximum feasible participation&dquo; by the poor--has burst upon the public consciousness. Right wing critics, both in and out of Congress, have branded community action programs as nothing less than a blueprint for revolution. Mayors across the nation charged the federal government with financing an attack on city hall, undermining local influenced and authority. 3 Welfare agencies, responding to a threat to their jurisdiction and claim to professional expertise, asserted simply that involving the poor is not feasible. In city after city attempts to implement community action programs have met with a struggle over the meaning of the clause and the extent and character of participation by the poor.This investigation was undertaken: (1) to illuminate the origins, the legislative history, and the intent of the &dquo;maximum feasible participation&dquo; clause; and (2) to determine its present status. It was guided by the following questions: What streams of thought were then current in American life that would have suggested such an approach? Was it the result of a changed view of the poor and their capabilities? Was there an awareness of the revolutionary implications to both the welfare and the political establishments in local communities, and ultimately to the nation as a whole? &dquo;MAXIMUM FEASIBLE PARTICIPATION&dquo;The Origins. From the President's &dquo;Message on Poverty&dquo; on March 16, 1964, wherein he commended the bill to the Congress, to its passage five months later, no public discussion of the participation clause took place. W'hile a great deal of discussion centered on the general provisions of Title II, the committee hearings4 reveal that, with the exception of the statement by then Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, 5 there is no mention of the clause by any other government official in several thousand pages of testimony. Even after Kennedy's testimony stressing the importance of participation in treating a community's ailments, 6 not one Congressman questioned its meaning or intent. The Congressional debates are equally devoid of discussion about &dquo;maximum feasible participation. &dquo;7