In this paper the experiences of taxpayers with the tax audits services as an important tool of tax authorities’ struggle against tax evasion are discussed. In the theoretical part of the paper the factors of tax compliance and the tax authorities’ measures in combating tax evasion are examined, the levels of tax rates and the compliance burden of European Union member states’ tax systems are compared. In the empirical part of the paper the experiences of Slovenian companies with tax audit services are analyzed. Better understanding of the drivers of taxpayer compliance behavior allows tax administration to identify and implement policy measures more effectively.

European Union no longer considers social responsibility (defined as responsibility for one's influences over society) a private affair of companies but requires member states to promote social responsibility and be its role model. Taxes may belong in this model, so do stateowned enterprises (SOEs). Given the importance of SOEs and recognizing the different practices of (tax) corporate governance, the article focuses on two objectives: firstly, the importance of the impact of the enterprise's key stakeholders in the business ethics planning, and secondly, the role of planning and implementation of tax accounting that will foster enterprises' long-term development and success based on the enterprise's ethical behavior. The article argues and suggests the ways in which business ethics and tax accounting could helpfully develop Ethical Tax Corporate Governance of SOEs.

In this paper we test the significance of norms and trust in authorities for voluntary tax compliance in Slovenia. The empirical analysis has shown that national and social norms are significant factor of tax compliance, whilst trust in authorities (the Parliament and the European Union) was not proved as significantly related variables of tax compliance in Slovenia. We discuss possible policy responses to our findings. Since norms and trust in authorities are non-economic factors of tax-compliance the indirect control approach, which focuses on the development of a high trust and high commitment culture of taxpayers has been examined more thoroughly. Due to the generally valid recognition that both direct and indirect control measures need to be used together to tackle the shadow economy, we briefly introduce the responsive regulation approach and the slippery slope framework.

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Teorija opredeljuje kakovost kapitalske strukture zelo različno. Nanjo vplivajo številni dejavniki. Pri posojilih med povezanimi osebami (kot obliki dolžniškega financiranja) in prihrankih, ki jih dosežemo pri tej obliki financiranja, družbe ustvarijo t. i. davčni ščit, njegovo prekomerno izkoriščanje pa države omejujejo s pravilom tanke kapitalizacije. V prispevku smo analizirali spreminjanje kapitalske strukture na primeru izbranih obvladujočih družb v Sloveniji za obdobje 1997-2012. Raziskava razkriva, da se je delež dolžniškega financiranja po sprejetju pravila tanke kapitalizacije v letu 2004 in kljub njegovemu zaostrovanju povečeval. Ključne besede: pravilo tanke kapitalizacije, kapitalska struktura, analiza bilance stanja, dolžniško financiranje AbstractTheory defines the quality of a capital structure in different ways, and many factors have an impact on it. In the case of loans between the related parties (as a form of debt financing) and the savings that can be achieved using this form of financing, the companies create a so-called tax shield, by which exploitation is restricted by the thin capitalization rules in many countries. In this paper, the changes in the capital structure of selected parent companies in Slovenia for the 1997-2012 period were analyzed. The survey reveals that the proportion of debt financing increased after the adoption of the thin capitalization rules in 2004 and despite its escalation. UvodTeorija opredeli kakovost kapitalske strukture 1 zelo različno. Nekateri avtorji jo vidijo v velikosti in razmerju lastniškega in dolžniškega kapitala, drugi v usklajenosti sredstev in njihove strukture s finančno strukturo (Bergant 2003(Bergant , 2012, tretji v zagotavljanju likvidnosti, denarnega toka in možnosti preskrbe ustreznih finančnih virov (Jovanović 2013). Po Modigliano-Millerjevem teoremu (1958, 1963 optimalna struktura kapitala ne obstaja, družbe pa svoje vrednosti ne morejo spreminjati s finančnimi odločitvami, temveč zgolj z investicijskimi. Če v model vključimo davke (predvsem davek od dohodkov pravnih 1 Kapitalska struktura je razmerje med dolžniškim (le dolgoročni dolgovi in ne tudi kratkoročni) in lastniškim kapitalom (Mramor 2002). Finančna struktura je razmerje med celotnimi (kratkoročnimi in dolgoročnimi) dolgovi in lastniškim kapitalom (Jovanović 2013) oz. razmerje med dolžniškim in lastniškim financiranjem (Ribnikar 2000).Prejeto/