Price decision is studied in a risk-averse retailer-dominated dual-channel supply chain, which consisting of one manufacturers and one retailer with both off-line and on-line channels. Firstly, two mean-variance models in centralized and decentralized supply chain are established. Secondly, the optimal solutions under the two decision modes are compared and analyzed. The results shows that the price of dual-channel of retailer decreased with the increase of retailers’ risk- aversion coefficient and the standard deviation of the fluctuation of market demand, while the wholesale price changes is on the contrary; in addition, when the market demand is greater than a certain value, the prices of dual channel are correspondingly higher in decentralized supply chain than in centralized supply chain, and vice versa. In addition, when the retailer’s risk aversion is in a certain interval, the expected utility of the whole supply chain is greater in centralized supply chain than in decentralized decision, and vice versa. Finally, a numerical example is given to verify the above conclusions.
More recently, the Chinese Government had been making appreciable efforts to stimulate and encourage entrepreneurial emission reductions. These efforts could be boosted by availability of dual asymmetric information about the adopted technology for efficient reduction and enterprises' investment strategies, possibly leading to adverse selection and moral hazard. This paper incorporates Stackelberg game model and incentive mechanism theory to find a feasible solution to dual asymmetric information problem. Hence firstly, through application of linear function of the total emission, an emission reduction contract would be formulated for regulating incentive payments from government to supervisory authorities followed by derivation of a two stage principal-agent monitoring model based on the enterprise's private information and action respectively. Some findings have been obtained through analysis of the monitoring models along with their comparison with the results of no monitoring scenario which confirm the effectiveness of hiring the supervisory authorities for monitoring of enterprises' emission reduction, which, ultimately, would facilitate increasing payoff and efficient emission reduction. In this perspective, the action-based monitoring mechanism depicts overall government dominance. Several, managerial insights have also been provided for various scenarios and propositions and all the findings are illustrated numerically. It could prove highly beneficial and significant to the government in encouraging entrepreneurial emission reductions.
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