It is sometimes argued that news reports in the media suffer from biased reporting. Mullainathan and Shleifer (2002, 2004) argue that there are two types of media bias. One bias, called ideology, reflects a news outlet's desire to affect reader opinions in a particular direction. The second bias, referred to as 'spin' or 'slanting', reflects the outlet's attempt to simply create a memorable story. Competition between outlets can eliminate the effect of ideological bias, but increases the incentive to spin or slant stories. We examine whether we find some evidence of spin in Dutch newspaper reporting on the state of the economy. If newspapers are indeed able to create memorable stories this should, according to our hypothesis, affect the opinion of readers with respect to the state of the economy. Sentiments about the actual state of the economy could be magnified by spin. As a result, consumer confidence can be expected to be affected not only by economic fundamentals, but also by the way these fundamentals are reported. We construct a variable that reflects the way consumers perceive economic news reported in newspapers. We find that this variable indeed has a significant impact on consumer confidence

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Optimal Central Bank transparencyvan der Cruijsen, C.A.B.; Eijffinger, Sylvester; Hoogduin, L.H. Published in: Journal of International Money and Finance Document version:Early version, also known as pre-print General rightsCopyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.-Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research -You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain -You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright, please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. b s t r a c tShould central banks increase their degree of transparency any further? We show that there is likely to be an optimal intermediate degree of central bank transparency. Up to this optimum more transparency is desirable: it improves the quality of private sector inflation forecasts. But beyond the optimum people might: (1) start to attach too much weight to the conditionality of their forecasts, and/or (2) get confused by the large and increasing amount of information they receive. This deteriorates the (perceived) quality of private sector inflation forecasts. As a result, inflation is set in a more backward looking manner resulting in higher inflation persistence. By using a large scale panel data set on the transparency of central banks we find empirical support for an optimal intermediate degree of transparency at which inflation persistence is minimized. Our results indicate that while several central banks would benefit from further transparency increases, some already have reached the optimal level.

We investigate the evolution of public debt management, the policy behaviour of debt managers, and the impact of debt management on financial stability and monetary policy.The focus is on the euro area. Empirical estimations of a debt management reaction function indicate that the share of short term debt (i) responds to the yield curve or the level of interest rates, in line with the objective of cost minimisation; and (ii) has been increasing especially since the onset of the economic crisis. The increase in short term debt brings about higher refinancing risks and strengthens the interaction of public debt management with financial stability and monetary policy. The sharp increase in cross border ownership of public debt since the adoption of the euro further amplifies potential spill-over effects. Policy recommendations focus on the need for transparency on the use of derivatives and prudent debt management that reflects broader macroeconomic considerations.