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Synthetic Biology (SynBio) is an interdisciplinary field at the interface of engineering and biology aiming to develop new biological systems and impart new functions to living cells. EFSA has been asked by the European Commission to evaluate SynBio developments in agri‐food with the aim of identifying the adequacy of existing guidelines for risk assessment and determine if updated guidance is needed. The scope of this opinion covers the molecular characterisation and environmental risk assessment of such genetically modified plants obtained through SynBio, meant to be for cultivation or food and feed purposes. The previous work on SynBio by the non‐food scientific Committees (2014, 2015) was used and complemented with the output of a horizon scanning exercise, which was commissioned by the EFSA to identify the most realistic and forthcoming SynBio cases of relevance to this remit. The horizon scan did not identify other sectors/advances in addition to the six SynBio categories previously identified by the non‐food scientific committees of the European Commission. The exercise did show that plant SynBio products reaching the market in the near future (next decade) are likely to apply SynBio approaches to their development using existing genetic modification and genome editing technologies. In addition, three hypothetical SynBio case studies were selected by the working group of the Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO), to further support the scoping exercise of this Scientific Opinion. Using the selected cases, the GMO Panel concludes that the requirements of the EU regulatory framework and existing EFSA guidelines are adequate for the risk assessment of SynBio products to be developed in the next 10 years, although specific requirements may not apply to all products. The GMO Panel acknowledges that as SynBio developments evolve, a need may exist to adjust the guidelines to ensure they are adequate and sufficient.

The European Commission requested the EFSA Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO) to assess whether section 4 (hazard identification) and the conclusions of EFSA's Scientific opinion on the risk assessment of plants developed using zinc finger nuclease type 3 technique (ZFN-3) and other site-directed nucleases (SDN) with similar function are valid for plants developed via SDN-1, SDN-2 and oligonucleotide-directed mutagenesis (ODM). In delivering this Opinion, the GMO Panel compared the hazards associated with plants produced via SDN-1, SDN-2 and ODM with those associated with plants obtained via both SDN-3 and conventional breeding. Unlike for SDN-3 methods, the application of SDN-1, SDN-2 and ODM approaches aims to modify genomic sequences in a way which can result in plants not containing any transgene, intragene or cisgene. Consequently, the GMO Panel concludes that those considerations which are specifically related to the presence of a transgene, intragene or cisgene included in section 4 and the conclusions of the Opinion on SDN-3 are not relevant to plants obtained via SDN-1, SDN-2 or ODM as defined in this Opinion. Overall, the GMO Panel did not identify new hazards specifically linked to the genomic modification produced via SDN-1, SDN-2 or ODM as compared with both SDN-3 and conventional breeding. Furthermore, the GMO Panel considers that the existing Guidance for risk assessment of food and feed from genetically modified plants and the Guidance on the environmental risk assessment of genetically modified plants are sufficient but are only partially applicable to plants generated via SDN-1, SDN-2 or ODM. Indeed, those guidance documents' requirements that are linked to the presence of exogenous DNA are not relevant for the risk assessment of plants developed via SDN-1, SDN-2 or ODM approaches if the genome of the final product does not contain exogenous DNA.

This statement supplements and updates the GMO Panel guidance document on allergenicity of genetically modified (GM) plants published in 2017. In that guidance document, the GMO Panel considered that additional investigations on in vitro protein digestibility were needed before providing any additional recommendations in the form of guidance to applicants. Thus, an interim phase was proposed to assess the utility of an enhanced in vitro digestion test, as compared to the classical pepsin resistance test. Historically, resistance to degradation by pepsin using the classical pepsin resistance test has been considered as additional information, in a weight‐of‐evidence approach, for the assessment of allergenicity and toxicity of newly expressed proteins in GM plants. However, more recent evidence does not support this test as a good predictor of allergenic potential for hazard. Furthermore, there is a need for more reliable systems to predict the fate of the proteins in the gastrointestinal tract and how they interact with the relevant human cells. Nevertheless, the classical pepsin resistance test can still provide some information on the physicochemical properties of novel proteins relating to their stability under acidic conditions. But other methods can be used to obtain data on protein's structural and/or functional integrity. It is acknowledged that the classical pepsin resistance test is embedded into international guidelines, e.g. Codex Alimentarius and Regulation (EU) No 503/2013. For future development, a deeper understanding of protein digestion in the gastrointestinal tract could enable the framing of more robust strategies for the safety assessment of proteins. Given the high complexity of the digestion and absorption process of dietary proteins, it is needed to clarify and identify the aspects that could be relevant to assess potential risks of allergenicity and toxicity of proteins. To this end, a series of research questions to be addressed are also formulated in this statement.

Advances in molecular and synthetic biology are enabling the engineering of gene drives in insects for disease vector/pest control. Engineered gene drives (that bias their own inheritance) can be designed either to suppress interbreeding target populations or modify them with a new genotype. Depending on the engineered gene drive system, theoretically, a genetic modification of interest could spread through target populations and persist indefinitely, or be restricted in its spread or persistence. While research on engineered gene drives and their applications in insects is advancing at a fast pace, it will take several years for technological developments to move to practical applications for deliberate release into the environment. Some gene drive modified insects (GDMIs) have been tested experimentally in the laboratory, but none has been assessed in small-scale confined field trials or in open release trials as yet. There is concern that the deliberate release of GDMIs in the environment may have possible irreversible and unintended consequences. As a proactive measure, the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) has been requested by the European Commission to review whether its previously published guidelines for the risk assessment of genetically modified animals (EFSA, 2012 and 2013), including insects (GMIs), are adequate and sufficient for GDMIs, primarily disease vectors, agricultural pests and invasive species, for deliberate release into the environment. Under this mandate, EFSA was not requested to develop risk assessment guidelines for GDMIs. In this Scientific Opinion, the Panel on Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO) concludes that EFSA's guidelines are adequate, but insufficient for the molecular characterisation (MC), environmental risk assessment (ERA) and post-market environmental monitoring (PMEM) of GDMIs. While the MC, ERA and PMEM of GDMIs can build on the existing risk assessment framework for GMIs that do not contain engineered gene drives, there are specific areas where further guidance is needed for GDMIs.