We examine whether public disclosures of tax reserves recently made available through Financial Interpretation No. 48 (FIN 48) reflect corporate tax shelter activities. Understanding this relation is important to corporate stakeholders and researchers keen to infer the aggressive nature of a firm's tax positions from its tax reserve accrual. Our study links public disclosures of tax reserves with mandatory private disclosures of tax shelter participation as made to the Internal Revenue Service's Office of Tax Shelter Analysis. We find strong, robust evidence that the tax reserve is positively associated with tax shelters, while other commonly used measures of tax avoidance are not. Based on out‐of‐sample tests, we also show that the reserve is a suitable summary measure for predicting tax shelters. The tax benefits of tax shelters are economically significant, accounting for up to 48% of the aggregate FIN 48 tax reserves in our sample.
We develop a model to examine the effects of Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Interpretation No. 48, Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes (FIN 48), on the strategic interaction between publicly traded corporate taxpayers and the government. Several of our findings contradict conjectures voiced by members of the business community regarding the economic effects of implementing FIN 48. Specifically, taxpayers with strong facts obtain higher expected payoffs from uncertain tax benefits and some disclosed liabilities understate the expected tax liability. Consistent with the common conjectures, however, some taxpayers are more likely to be audited or are deterred from entering into transactions that generate uncertain tax benefits because of FIN 48.
Our study examines how the uniform rules of FIN 48, which governs accounting for income tax uncertainty, affect the relevance of income tax accounting. By requiring all firms to follow the same recognition and measurement process, the FASB intended FIN 48 to improve the relevance of income tax accounting. However, practitioners argue that reserves reported under FIN 48 lack relevance because they represent liabilities that will never be paid to tax authorities. Consistent with these concerns, we estimate that over a three-year period, only 24 cents of every dollar of reserves unwind via settlements. Moreover, contrary to the FASB's intention, we find no evidence that FIN 48 increased the ability of tax expense to predict future tax cash flows. Rather, we find that the predictive ability of tax expense for future tax cash flows decreases among firms for which FIN 48 is most restrictive. Finally, we find no evidence that investors identify firms for which reserves overstate future tax cash outflows and incorporate this into their valuations. Our results provide evidence that the uniform accounting rules of FIN 48 negatively affect the relevance of income tax accounting.
JEL Classifications: H25; M41; M48.
We examine whether proprietary costs affect disclosure quality and how investors react to disclosure quality in a new proprietary cost setting. We apply Verrecchia's (1983) proprietary cost theory to the FIN 48 adoption setting and argue that proprietary costs result from beliefs that the new disclosures could weaken a firm's competitive position when negotiating with tax authorities. FIN 48 is an ideal setting to examine how proprietary costs affect disclosure given the proprietary nature of uncertain tax positions, and the ability to construct objective measures of both proprietary costs and disclosure quality. We construct disclosure quality scores for S&P 1500 firms and offer two empirical findings. First, we find a negative association between proprietary costs and disclosure quality. Second, investors reward firms for low disclosure quality, especially small firms and firms with high proprietary costs. Both findings are consistent with Verrecchia's (1983) theory, and suggest that proprietary costs moderate investor demand for full disclosure.
JEL Classifications: G14, L15, M41, M44, M45
This study finds evidence that public-company reporting by U.S. multinational corporations (MNCs) creates disincentives to repatriate foreign earnings to the U.S. and contributes to the accumulation of cash abroad. MNCs operate under U.S. international tax laws and financial reporting rules and face two potential consequences when they repatriate foreign earnings: a cash payment for repatriation taxes and a reduction in reported accounting earnings. Using a confidential dataset of financial and operating characteristics of foreign affiliates of MNCs combined with public-company data, we examine how repatriation amounts vary across firms that face relatively strong reporting incentives to defer an accounting expense. Our results suggest that reporting incentives reduce repatriations by about 17 to 21 percent annually.
Data Availability: Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) data were made available to the authors under a legal confidentiality arrangement; all non-BEA data are available from public sources.
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