Human cooperation is highly unusual. We live in large groups composed mostly of non-relatives. Evolutionists have proposed a number of explanations for this pattern, including cultural group selection and extensions of more general processes such as reciprocity, kin selection, and multi-level selection acting on genes. Evolutionary processes are consilient; they affect several different empirical domains, such as patterns of behavior and the proximal drivers of that behavior. In this target article, we sketch the evidence from five domains that bear on the explanatory adequacy of cultural group selection and competing hypotheses to explain human cooperation. Does cultural transmission constitute an inheritance system that can evolve in a Darwinian fashion? Are the norms that underpin institutions among the cultural traits so transmitted? Do we observe sufficient variation at the level of groups of considerable size for group selection to be a plausible process? Do human groups compete, and do success and failure in competition depend upon cultural variation? Do we observe adaptations for cooperation in humans that most plausibly arose by cultural group selection? If the answer to one of these questions is "no," then we must look to other hypotheses. We present evidence, including quantitative evidence, that the answer to all of the questions is "yes" and argue that we must take the cultural group selection hypothesis seriously. If culturally transmitted systems of rules (institutions) that limit individual deviance organize cooperation in human societies, then it is not clear that any extant alternative to cultural group selection can be a complete explanation.Keywords: competition; culture; evolution; group selection; heritable variation; institutions; norms BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2016) KARL FROST is a Ph.D. candidate in Ecology at the University of California, Davis. He researches the cultural evolution of prosociality via religion and ritual practices, using behavioral experiments, gene-culture coevolution models, and field research in Canada looking at environmental activism in the face of the tar sands oil industry and an antagonistic government. He also directs the Body Research Physical Theater and is interested in cross-cultural exchange of theater practice as theater anthropology and arts-science fusion.

As societies modernize, they go through what has become known as "the demographic transition;" couples begin to limit the size of their families. Models to explain this change assume that reproductive behavior is either under individual control or under social control. The evidence that social influence plays a role in the control of reproduction is strong, but the models cannot adequately explain why the development of small family norms always accompanies modernization. We suggest that the widening of social networks, which has been found to occur with modernization, is sufficient to explain the change in reproductive norms if it is assumed that (a) advice and comment on reproduction that passes among kin is more likely to encourage the creation of families than that which passes among nonkin and (b) this advice and comment influence the social norms induced from the communications. This would, through a process of cultural evolution, lead to the development of norms that make it increasingly difficult to have large families.

Copying others appears to be a cost-effective way of obtaining adaptive information, particularly when flexibly employed. However, adult humans differ considerably in their propensity to use information from others, even when this 'social information' is beneficial, raising the possibility that stable individual differences constrain flexibility in social information use. We used two dissimilar decision-making computer games to investigate whether individuals flexibly adjusted their use of social information to current conditions or whether they valued social information similarly in both games. Participants also completed established personality questionnaires. We found that participants demonstrated considerable flexibility, adjusting social information use to current conditions. In particular, individuals employed a 'copy-when-uncertain' social learning strategy, supporting a core, but untested, assumption of influential theoretical models of cultural transmission. Moreover, participants adjusted the amount invested in their decision based on the perceived reliability of personally gathered information combined with the available social information. However, despite this strategic flexibility, participants also exhibited consistent individual differences in their propensities to use and value social information. Moreover, individuals who favoured social information selfreported as more collectivist than others. We discuss the implications of our results for social information use and cultural transmission.

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