Although most researchers who have investigated the effect of expectancy on memory for behavioral information have found a recall superiority for schema-inconsistent information, this finding appears to occur most clearly only when an individual, rather than individuals in a group, is seen as performing the behaviors. In this study we demonstrate first that the individual-group distinction is important in obtaining a recall superiority of schema-inconsistent behaviors. We then investigate a mechanism hypothesized to underlie these effects, one that attributes the recall enhancement to extra processing given to inconsistent items. We obtain evidence supporting this mechanism from a study in which we measure reading times for behavior statements. We discuss the relevance of these findings to recent experiments.

The effect of contextual variability on memory for frequency was investigated in two incidental-learning experiments. In Experiment 1, stimuli were nouns, which subjects rated on semantic scales that either varied from presentation to presentation or remained the same. In Experiment 2, the stimuli were names of celebrities, appearing in statements that were either different on each presentation or always the same. In both experiments, high variability produced lower frequency judgments than did low variability. Unlike judged frequency, free recall and recognition memory were enhanced by variability. A multiple-trace hypothesis can account for these results if imperfect retrieval is assumed. A prepositional-encoding hypothesis apparently must assume, in addition to imperfect retrieval, that the encoding of frequency information is obligatory, rather than optional.

Mood-congruent memory (MCM) bias in depression was investigated using 4 different implicit memory tests. Two of the implicit tests were perceptually driven, and 2 were conceptually driven. Depressed participants and nondepressed controls were assigned to 1 of 4 implicit memory tests after studying positive and negative adjectives. Results showed no MCM bias in the perceptually driven tests. MCM was demonstrated in 1 of the conceptually driven tests, but only for adjectives that were conceptually encoded. Results support the theory that mood-congruent processes in depression are limited to conceptual processing. However, activation of conceptual processes may not be sufficient for demonstrating mood congruency.

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In two experiments on memory for pictures, a frequency-discrimination task was used to determine whether recognition decisions display slower forgetting than do discriminations among frequencies greater than O. Experiment 1 compared frequency discriminations of 1-0 (recognition), 2-1, 4-1, and 4-2 and tested retention over an interval of 1 week. Experiment 2 added another recognition condition (2-0) and extended retention to 2 weeks. Neither experiment showed evidence for differential forgetting. The outcome is consistent with the hypothesis that the information underlying recognition memory and memory for frequency is qualitatively the same.Are judgments of presentation frequency and judgments of recognition memory based on the same kind of remembered information? Intuitively , it seems they may not be-especially if the to-be-remembered items were initially unfamiliar. With such materials, a recognition judgment could be based simply on the feeling that the test item is familiar , whereas an accurate frequency judgment seems to require access to information of a more specific and qualititatively different kind . We are concerned here with the question of whether a qualitative difference in the kind of information underlying these two tasks might be reflected in forgetting rates . Specifically, this study contrasts two hypotheses : (I) that forgetting is slower in recognition memory than in memory for frequency, and (2) that the two forgetting rates are the same.Some theoretical flesh might be put on the first hypothesis by invoking the distinction between generic memory-for abstract, general knowledge-and episodic memory-for specific, autobiographical experiences. This basic distinction has been made under various labels by a number of authors (see Hermann, 1982). Memory for frequency , like that for other details of presentation (e .g., modality, context, recency) is inherently episodic . On the other hand, a feeling of familiarity, in the absence of awareness of such details, could be considered a reflection of generic memory. If information in episodic memory is more easily lost than that in generic memory , as Tulving (1972Tulving ( , 1983 suggested, then the forgetting rate shown by a particular task should depend on the This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant BNS-7824987. Requests for reprints should be sent to Douglas L. Hintzman, Department of Psychology, University of Oregon, Eugene, OR 97403 . relative weights given by that task to generic and episodic information . Thus, if recognition memory relies more on the general feeling of familiarity and less on episodic information than does memory for frequency, then recognition performance should display slower forgetting than is shown by frequency discrimination.