The purpose of this paper is twofold: first to expIain "pressures for conformity" from the logical relationship of conformity to certain interaction patterns known to be rewarding, i.e., perceived consensus, fulfillment of expectations, and influence; second, to show the relationships between the formulations of Festinger and Newcomb, and to partially integrate their analyses with the one presented here. A small-scale empirical study is presented which lends some confirmation to the logical analysis.The present analysis is presented as a more acceptable alternative to Festinger's derivation of pressures for conformity from a postulated "drive to evaluate one's opinions" and the empirical observation that those with similar opinions are used for comparison and evaluation of one's own opinions.1 According to Festinger, we try to reduce discrepancies in order to have similar opinions with which to compare our own. I n his analysis we create "conformity" (or approach it) in order to make comparisons. There are several difficulties in this hypothesis. First there is the difficulty of having to postulate a special drive from which to derive the pressures for conformity. Second, there are difficulties in avoiding tautological statements in determining how similar the opinion must be before the comparison can be made. More fundamentally, however, to this writer it is not satisfactory to postulate the making of comparisons as a drive-goal, as though the comparison itself were then drive reducing. Rather the present argument develops logic based on the point of view that we make comparisons and reduce discrepancies in order to achieve a state of relationships among interactors which is rewarding. This state is not postulated as rewarding simply because of the conformity of the interactors, but because conformity exists in situations which are rewarding on the basis of other factors logically related to conformity.As seen here, interactors do not work toward a state of conformity simply because conformity per se is rewarding. They work toward maximizing their rewards from interaction. If conformity can be shown * Revised and expanded version of paper presented at the annual meetings of the American Sociological Association, St. Louis, Mo., August, 1961. Appreciation is expressed to Robert M.Stokes for his assistance in collecting and processing the data.

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HAT happens to a person's private opinion if he is forced to do or say something contrary to that opinion? Only recently has there been, any experimental work related to this question. Two studies reported by Janis and King (1954;1956) clearly showed that, at least under some conditions, the private opinion changes so as to bring it into closer correspondence with the overt behavior the person was forced to perform. Specifically, they showed that if a person is forced to improvise a speech supporting a point of view with which he disagrees, his private opinion moves toward the position advocated in the speech. The observed opinion change is greater than for persons who only hear the speech or for persons who read a prepared speech with emphasis solely on elocution and manner of delivery. The authors of these two studies explain their results mainly in terms of mental rehearsal and thinking up new arguments. Inthisway, they propose, theperson who is forced to improvise a speech convinces himself. They present some evidence, which is not altogether conclusive, in support of this explanation. We will have more to say concerning this explanation in discussing the results of our experiment. Kelrnan (1953) tried to pursue the matter further. He reasoned that if the person is induced to make an overt statement contrary to his private opinion by the offer of some reward, then the greater the reward offered, the greater should be the subsequent opinion change. His data, however, did not support this idea. He found, rather, that a large reward produced less subsequent opinion change than did a smaller reward. Actually, this finding by Kelman is consistent with the theory we will outline below but, for a number of reasons, is 1 The experiment reported here was done as part of a program of research supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation to the senior author. We wish to thank Leonard Hommel, Judson Mills, and Robert Tenvilliger for their help in designing and carrying out the experiment. We would also like to acknowledge the help of Ruth Smith and Marilyn M. Miller.

The importance of strict theory in developing and guiding programs of research is becoming more and more recognized today. Yet there is considerable disagreement about exactly how strict and precise a theoretical formulation must be at various stages in the development of a body of knowledge. Certainly there a r e many who feel that some 'theorizing" is too vague and indefinite to be of much use. It is also argued that such vague and broad 'theorizing" may actually hinder the empirical development of an area of knowledge.There are, on the other hand many who express dissatisfactions with instances of very precise theories which do exist here and there, for somehow o r other a precise and specific theory seems to them to leave out the 'real" psychological problem. These persons seem to be more concerned with those aspects of the problem which the precise theory has not yet touched. From this point of view it is argued that such too precise and too strict theorizing may also hinder the empirical development of an a r e a of knowledge.