Corporations increasingly engage in innovative 'tax planning strategies' by shifting profits between jurisdictions. In response, states try to curtail such profit shifting activities while at the same time attempting to retain and attract multinational corporations. We aim to open up this dichotomy between states and corporations and argue that a wealth defence industry of professional service firms plays a crucial role as facilitators. We investigate the subsidiary structure of 27,000 MNCs and show that clients of the Big Four accountancy firms show systematically higher levels of aggressive tax planning strategies than clients of smaller accountancy firms. We specify this effect for three distinct strategies and also uncover marked differences across countries. As such we provide empirical evidence for the systematic involvement of auditors as facilitators in corporate wealth defence.

A large-scale study on accountancy firms as profit shifting facilitators Corporations increasingly engage in innovative 'tax planning strategies' by shifting profits between jurisdictions. In response, states try to curtail such profit shifting activities while at the same time attempting to retain and attract multinational corporations. We aim to open up this dichotomy between states and corporations and argue that a wealth defence industry of professional service firms plays a crucial role as intermediaries. We investigate the subsidiary structure of 27,000 MNCs and show that clients of the Big Four accounting firms show systematically higher levels of aggressive tax planning strategies than clients of smaller accounting firms. We specify this effect for three distinct strategies and also uncover marked differences across countries. As such we provide empirical evidence for the systematic involvement of auditors as intermediaries in corporate wealth defence.

Status attainment theories assert that individuals are recruited based on the length and functional background of their training. Elite theories assume that top managers often deviate from these socially acceptable mechanisms of status attainment to entrench their advantage. In this study, focusing on the US financial sector, we investigate whether educational institution prestige—rather than the subject or length of education—increasingly influences appointments to top executive positions. We analyze 1987 US top executive managers affiliated with 147 firms from both financial and non‐financial sectors in 2005 and 2018. Our study demonstrates that alumni of prestigious universities have a strikingly higher likelihood of attaining a top executive role in finance than in non‐finance. Within finance it is no longer investment banking, but private equity, that contains the highest proportion of elite university graduates. Our findings suggest that notwithstanding the major power shifts between finance and non‐finance—and also within the finance sector—elite groups still dominate the most symbolically valued education, and as a result, top managerial positions.

In this article, I argue that small, but lucrative high-status subgroups lead to an upward ratcheting of compensation levels through the diffusion of norms. Combining relational theories of inequalities and theories of social norms I show how subfield status hierarchies play out at the firm level. I examine the impact of excess compensation in alternative finance (private equity, hedge and venture funds) on traditional finance. Based on multilevel regression on 2159 US and UK executives and longitudinal analyses on 261 firms from 2010 to 2017, I find first, that managers with an alternative finance background receive a pay premium in traditional finance (19.7%). Secondly, within the UK, compensation levels in organizations that witnessed the arrival of sectoral migrants rise above the expected increase. The findings suggest that understanding income dynamics requires detailed scrutiny of high-status subgroups, especially if activities are structured as opaque and lightly regulated organizational forms.