EXECUTIVE SUMMARYThis article investigates the need and ability of competitive intelligence (CI) departments to become accountable for the work they produce. Synthesis of current literature on CI and advertising effectiveness measures resulted in the creation of a Competitive Intelligence Measurement Model (CIMM), which provides concrete generic measures for determining CI effectiveness. Additionally, the model aids in the calculation of the return on competitive intelligence investment (ROCII). CIMM classifies CI output into two categories: short-term tactical CI output and long-term strategic CI output. The model describes measures needed to determine effectiveness of CI output and explains how to calculate ROCII.
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The paper discusses how the Commission is shaping a decentralisation policy in the antitrust field. The paper details the procedural architecture ‐ “degrees of priority”, “preconditions for decentralisation” and “Community interest” ‐ which gives the Commission sole discretion to decide whether an antitrust case is dealt with by Brussels or is referred to a Member State. It reveals that the decentralisation procedure has been set up by the Commission, with the blessing of the Community courts, but with little real consultation with the Member States. The paper points out that the decision whether to decentralise turns on a new, qualitative and Commission decided Community interest test. The paper emphasises that the Community interest test runs in parallel with ‐ and has a similar function to ‐ a number of decentralisation provisions which already exist. The final section of the paper contrasts Community interest as a decentralisation test with the rival, and pre‐existing, quantitative approach to decentralisation ‐ the Community dimension test ‐ contained in the EC Merger Control Regulation (MCR). It explains that both tests have strengths and weaknesses and that the recent reform of the MCR has not fully addressed these concerns in respect to Community dimension. The paper’s main conclusion is that the Commission’s appropriation of the ability to decide which Member States are competent to deal with decentralised antitrust cases has created the possibility of a fragmented or two‐speed Europe in competition regulation.
Notes that the notion of a "substantial part" of the Common Market (European Union) has significance in terms of European competitive regulation and policy. Points out that without this term European competition policy would be limited to cases involving the whole of the Community. Examines a range of competing interpretations of this key term and reveals that the European Court and the European Commission have adopted different interpretations in dealing with the issue of a "substantial part". Considers the reasons for this divergence and suggests that proposals for revisions to Article 9 of the Merger Control Regulation may end the divergence.
In March 1998, the first major revision of the European Merger Control Regulation (MCR) came into effect with particular implications for the demarcation of authority for merger control between member states and European level competition authorities and for the treatment of joint ventures. The overall balance of the reform is mixed. Changes to the threshold test, for example, ensure that the MCR will capture proposed concentrations which have a Community dimension but which were missed by the original test. However, the cost of the revision is greater complexity and, with this, greater opacity. Both tests are form‐based and deal with aggregate turnover and are insufficiently sensitive to capture the competition effects of the merger in individual product markets. Article 9 implicitly recognises this flaw by providing a second decentralisation test. Again, the revision of Article 9 has added to the complexity of the operation of the MCR. An alternative would be to dispense with Article 9 altogether. The revisions improve the consistency of the MCR by introducing a “one stop shop” for the treatment of joint ventures, some of which were previously dealt with under Article 85. However, the codification of joint venture provisions creates a situation in which the Commission is required to investigate aspects of a joint venture which are national rather than European in nature.
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