Can the quality of school management explain differences in student test scores? In this paper I present the first internationally benchmarked estimates of school management quality in Africa (based on the "World Management Survey"). The level and distribution of management quality is similar to that found in other low and middle-income countries (India and Brazil). I combine this data with individual student panel data, and demonstrate that differences in school management quality matter for student value-added-a standard deviation difference in management is associated with a 0.06 standard deviation difference in test scores. Finally I contribute to understanding the role of the private sector in education in a low-income setting. Contrary to common perception, I find no difference between the quality of school management in government, private, or public-private partnership (PPP) schools (despite the higher level of autonomy available to them). An exception is an internationally-owned chain of PPP schools, which are as well managed as schools in the UK.

Can the quality of school management explain differences in student test scores? In this paper I present the first internationally benchmarked estimates of school management quality in Africa (based on the "World Management Survey"). The level and distribution of management quality is similar to that found in other low and middle-income countries (India and Brazil). I combine this data with individual student panel data, and demonstrate that differences in school management quality matter for student value-added-a standard deviation difference in management is associated with a 0.06 standard deviation difference in test scores. Finally I contribute to understanding the role of the private sector in education in a low-income setting. Contrary to common perception, I find no difference between the quality of school management in government, private, or public-private partnership (PPP) schools (despite the higher level of autonomy available to them). An exception is an internationally-owned chain of PPP schools, which are as well managed as schools in the UK.

The private school sector has expanded with almost no public intervention to educate half of primary school children in many urban centers in Africa and Asia. Simple comparisons of test scores would suggest that these private schools may provide better quality than public schools, but how much of this difference is due to selection effects is unclear. Much donor and policymaker attention has proceeded on the basis that private schools do perform better, and focused on models of public subsidy to expand access, and investment in networks or chains to encourage expansion. We review the evidence of the effects of private schools on learning, and how that effect translates to public-private partnerships (PPPs). We also study the effects of private school chains. We conduct a systematic review for eligible studies, with transparent search criteria. The search resulted in over 100 studies on low-cost private schools and PPPs, with a large majority being on low-cost private schools. Our meta-analysis shows moderately strong effects from private schooling, although the limited number of experimental studies find much smaller effects than quasi-experimental studies. This advantage, though, is not nearly enough to help most children reach important learning goals. Turning to policy goals, we find that the private school advantage has not translated to public private partnerships, which have shown limited value in improving quality. They can however represent a lower-cost means of increasing access to school. We also find that private school chains perform little better than individual private schools and have little scope for achieving meaningful scale.

Can governments contract out the management of schools to private operators at scale? This paper estimates the effect of a school reform in Punjab, Pakistan, in which 4,276 poorly performing public primary schools (around 10 percent of the total) were contracted out to private operators in a single school year. These schools remain free to students and the private operator receives a per-student subsidy equivalent to less than half of spending in government schools. Using a difference-indifference framework we estimate that enrolment in converted schools increased by over 60 percent. Converted schools see a slight decline in overall average test scores, but this may be a composition effect rather than a treatment effect. Schools with the same number or fewer students as in the previous year saw no change in average test scores.

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Value-added models (VAMS) are commonly used in highincome countries for measuring the quality of teachers and schools, on the grounds that they are a fairer reflection of true quality than simple average test scores, as they account for differences in student intake. Not accounting for student's prior test scores can give a misleading impression of school quality. In this article, we adapt the current VAM of secondary school quality to the Ugandan context, and test its robustness.Using official test score data from Uganda, we test the robustness of the model to a range of different empirical specifications, including sensitivity to the inclusion of controls for student socioeconomic status. We find that the model is robust to a variety of different specifications and control variables.The VAM is low cost and has the potential to provide a clearer signal to parents, teachers, schools, and policy-makers about how much learning is actually happening in different schools.This approach could be carried out at low cost in a wide range of low-income countries that have similar testing regimes.

Are Labour party politicians anti-Semitic, and are Conservative party politicians Islamophobic? In this correspondence study we measure the responsiveness of elected local representatives in the United Kingdom to requests from putative constituents from minority religious groups. We send short email requests to 10,268 local government representatives from each of the main political parties, from stereotypically Islamic, Jewish, and Christian names. Response rates are six to seven percentage points lower to stereotypically Muslim or Jewish names. The two major political parties both show equal bias towards the two minority group names. Results suggest that the bias in response may be implicit. Bias is lower in more dense and diverse locations.

Highlights Learning profiles allow us to trace learning progress through schooling. In this paper I estimate a learning profile for Rwanda using a household-based survey of children. I use a detailed schooling history to show that observational learning profiles that don’t explicitly account for repetition and dropout may substantially over-state learning gains per year.