n recent years, a number of writers have attempted to appropriate Nietzsche's thought, or significant elements of it, for democratic politics. 1 Needless to say, such projects are surprising, since Nietzsche was a notorious opponent of democracy and liberalism. In a nutshell, these projects have suggested that Nietzsche's emancipatory critique of Western foundationalism, essentialism, and rationalism can help correct supposed blind spots and exclusions haunting modern political ideals born out of the Enlightenment. Nietzsche's celebration of perspectivism, the openness of identity, and agonistic dynamism can prepare a vision of democratic life that is more vibrant, inclusive, creative, and life-affirming than that of modern political theories grounded in the rational subject.Of course such ventures have met criticism, especially from those who resist the embrace of Nietzsche in much of Continental thought. Jürgen Habermas has been in the forefront of this resistance in Germany. 2 And a recent collection of essays from France, Why We Are Not Nietzscheans, 3 has reproached so-called French Nietzscheans such as Derrida, Foucault, and Deleuze for not owning up to the political dangers of Nietzsche's thought. Writers such as Descombes, Ferry, and Renaut have aimed to retrieve a political conception of the subject, particularly as it pertains to the question of human rights. Their charge is that embracing Nietzsche's vitalism, immoralism, and/or elitism is either not relevant to actual political conditions or blind to the authoritarian impulses in Nietzsche's texts. 4 In America, a new book by Fredrick Appel, Nietzsche Contra Democracy, presents a cogent criticism of attempts to employ Nietzsche for democratic purposes, particularly with respect to agonistics. In this essay I want to focus on Appels challenge and attempt to reiterate the viability of a Nietzschean agonistics for democratic politics. 5 132