Recent results from Cannon, Hayes, and Tipper (2010) have established that the Action Compatibility Effect (ACE) is hedonically marked and elicits a genuine positive reaction. In this work, we aim to show that the hedonic marking of the ACE has incidental consequences on affective judgment. For this, we used the affective priming paradigm principle (for a review, see Musch & Klauer, 2003): participants have to respond, as quickly as they can, regarding the pleasantness or unpleasantness character of a target word. In the priming phase, we do not present an affective stimulus; however, we present two different graspable objects, one after the other. The handles of the graspable objects are shown either both on the same side (i.e., perceptual action compatibility) or not (i.e., perceptual action incompatibility). In addition, the orientation of the handles of the objects are either compatible (i.e., action compatibility) or not (i.e., action compatibility) with the response hand used for the word evaluation. Consistent with our hypothesis, participants responded faster to positive words after perceptual action compatibility and action compatibility (thus demonstrating the ACE) than after incompatibility conditions.

This study explores the influence of typical size during a categorization task. The specificity of this experimental work is based on the homogeneity of the graphic stimuli size. We have created a typical size standard of our stimuli, that concerns the real size of the objects represented by the drawings of homogeneous sizes. Then, a priming experiment was performed in which the prime and target drawings had two types of relations: a typical size, and a categorial. The participants are naïve as to the typical size relation between prime and target. The results show a positive priming effect of the typical size but not of the category. The results are discussed in term of theoretical approach developed by Barsalou and his colleagues (1999, 2003). In this theoretical framework, the typical size can be considered as a perceptual knowledge. In that way, we propose that participants could automatically simulate the typical size as soon as they perceived the drawings of objects with homegenous sizes.

No abstract

No abstract

The Simon effect usually refers to the observation that responding to a nonspatial feature of a stimulus is faster when the position of the stimulus (task-irrelevant) matches the position of the to-be-executed response. The Simon effect can disappear when the Simon task is preceded by a spatial compatibility task with an incompatible mapping. In this experiment, during a preliminary phase, 20 children had to decide whether the outline of a colored stimulus was dotted or continuous. Green stimuli were presented exclusively on the right, whereas red stimuli were presented on the left (the color was task-irrelevant). The participants then had to perform a Simon task. When the instructions required them to press either the left or the right button for red or green stimuli, respectively (Group A), the Simon effect on response latencies was not significant. With the opposite instructions (the right or left button for red or green stimuli, respectively; Group B), the Simon effect was significant on response latencies. The Simon effect was significant on movement times for both groups. These results suggest that during the preliminary phase, each color became associated with the manual response automatically activated by that color's position. In the subsequent Simon task, the presentation of the color activated the associated response. This modulated the planning of the to-beexecuted response.

“How can perception be altered by language?” is the fundamental question of this article. Indeed, various studies have pointed out the influence of colour-related knowledge on object and colour perception, evoked by linguistic stimuli. Here the relevance of the simulationist approach is assumed in order to explain this influence, where the understanding of colour-related words or sentences involves a process of colour simulation that is supported by a neuronal network partially similar to the network involved in colour perception. Consequently, colour-related knowledge and colour perception can interact through a process of pattern interference. In support of this idea, studies are discussed showing priming effects between colour simulation and colour perception, but two limitations are also raised. Firstly, these works all used between-category colour discrimination tasks that allow the intervention of lexical processes that can also explain priming. Secondly, these works control the congruency link between prime and target at the level of ‘colour category’, and no demonstration is made of an influence at the level of specific hues. Consequently, the simulationist view of language/perception interactions seems an interesting way to thinking but more experimens are needed in order to overcome some limitations.

No abstract

Seeing objects usually grasped with a power or a precision grip (e.g., an apple vs. a cherry) potentiates power-grip and precision-grip responses, respectively. An embodied account suggests that this effect occurs because object conceptual representations would lie on a motor simulation process. A new account, named the size-coding account, argues that this effect could be rather due to an overlapping of size codes used to represent both manipulable objects and response options. In this paper, we investigate whether this potentiation effect could be merely due to a low-level visual feature that favor a size-coding of stimuli: the visual size in which objects are presented. Accordingly, we conducted two experiments in which we presented highly elementary and non-graspable stimuli (i.e., ink spots) either large or small rather than graspable objects. Our results showed that the mere visual size automatically potentiates power- and precision-grip responses that is in line with the size-coding account of the potentiation effect of grasping behaviors. Moreover, these results appeal to improve the methodological control of the size of stimuli especially when researchers try to support the embodied account.