The rapid spread of the new influenza virus A(H1N1)v in young age groups in 2009 has been partly attributed to a high transmission intensity in schools. However, detailed characterization of the spread of influenza in school populations has been difficult to obtain, simply because it is very hard to identify who infected whom in a large outbreak. Data collected in large outbreak investigations typically miss many transmission events, and some reported transmission events will be incorrect. Here the authors present robust likelihood-based methods that can be used to analyze outbreak data while explicitly accounting for both missing data and erroneous data. They apply this method to a school-based outbreak of pandemic influenza A(H1N1)v that occurred in London, United Kingdom, in April 2009. The authors show that the generation interval in this school-based population was 2.20 days and that the reproduction number declined coincident with school closure, from 1.33 secondary cases per primary case to 0.43 secondary cases per primary case. These results provide quantitative evidence for the change in influenza transmission that is to be expected from school closure.

On 29 April 2009, an imported case of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus infection was detected in a London school. As further cases, pupils and staff members were identified, school closure and mass prophylaxis were implemented. An observational descriptive study was conducted to provide an insight into the clinical presentation and transmission dynamics in this setting. Between 15 April and 15 May 2009, 91 symptomatic cases were identified: 33 were confirmed positive for pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus infection; 57 were tested negative; in one the results were unavailable. Transmission occurred first within the school, and subsequently outside. Attack rates were 2% in pupils (15% in the 11-12 years age group) and 17% in household contacts. The predominant symptoms were fever (97%), respiratory symptoms (91%), and sore throat (79%). Limited spread in the school may have been due to a combination of school closure and mass prophylaxis. However, transmission continued through household contacts to other schools.

Monitoring of antiviral resistance is strongly recommended for immunocompromised patients.

During the winter period 2010/11 27 epidemiologically unlinked, confirmed cases of oseltamivir-resistant influenza A(H1N1)2009 virus infection have been detected in multiple, geographically dispersed settings. Three of these cases were in community settings, with no known exposure to oseltamivir. This suggests possible onward transmission of resistant strains and could be an indication of a possibility of changing epidemiology of oseltamivir-resistant influenza A(H1N1)2009 virus.

The observed excess of cases of Q fever in Florac, an area endemic for this infection, in spring 2007 could be explained by an aerial transmission from infectious ovine flocks situated close to the town. All local herd owners were re-educated about the risks and prevention practices for Q fever.