The comparator account holds that processes of motor prediction contribute to the sense of agency by attenuating incoming sensory information and that disruptions to this process contribute to misattributions of agency in schizophrenia. Over the last 25 years this simple and powerful model has gained widespread support not only as it relates to bodily actions but also as an account of misattributions of agency for inner speech, potentially explaining the etiology of auditory verbal hallucination (AVH). In this paper we provide a detailed analysis of the traditional comparator account for inner speech, pointing out serious problems with the specification of inner speech on which it is based and highlighting inconsistencies in the interpretation of the electrophysiological evidence commonly cited in its favor. In light of these analyses we propose a new comparator account of misattributed inner speech. The new account follows leading models of motor imagery in proposing that inner speech is not attenuated by motor prediction, but rather derived directly from it. We describe how failures of motor prediction would therefore directly affect the phenomenology of inner speech and trigger a mismatch in the comparison between motor prediction and motor intention, contributing to abnormal feelings of agency. We argue that the new account fits with the emerging phenomenological evidence that AVHs are both distinct from ordinary inner speech and heterogeneous. Finally, we explore the possibility that the new comparator account may extend to explain disruptions across a range of imagistic modalities, and outline avenues for future research.
Over the last thirty years the comparator hypothesis has emerged as a prominent account of inner speech pathology. This chapter discusses a number of cognitive accounts broadly derived from this approach, highlighting the existence of two importantly distinct notions of inner speech in the literature; one as a prediction in the absence of sensory input, the other as an act with sensory consequences that are themselves predicted. Under earlier frameworks in which inner speech is described in the context of classic models of motor control, I argue that these two notions may be compatible, providing two routes to inner speech pathology. Under more recent accounts grounded in the architecture of Bayesian predictive processing, I argue that “active inference” approaches to action generation pose serious challenges to the plausibility of the latter notion of inner speech, while providing the former notion with rich explanatory possibilities for inner speech pathology.
In a recent article (Astuti and Bloch, 2015), cognitive anthropologists Astuti and Bloch claim that the Malagasy are ambivalent as to whether considerations of intentionality are relevant to moral judgments concerning incest and its presumed catastrophic consequences: when making moral judgments about those who commit incest, the Malagasy take into account whether the incest is intentional or not, but, when making moral judgments relating to incest’s catastrophic consequences, they do not take intentionality into account. Astuti and Bloch explain the irrelevance of intentionality in terms of incest entailing such a fundamental attack on the transcendental social order that the Malagasy become dumbfounded and leave aside considerations of intentionality. Finally, they claim that a similar dumbfound reaction is what is involved in the moral dumbfounding concerning incest that social psychologist Jonathan Haidt has found in the US. In this article, we argue that (i) Astuti and Bloch are unclear about many aspects of their claims (in particular, about the moral judgments at stake), (ii) they do not provide sufficient evidence that considerations of intentionality are deemed irrelevant to moral judgments relating to incest’s presumed catastrophic consequences (and hence for the claim that the Malagasy are ambivalent), (iii) their hypothesis that conceiving of incest as an attack on the transcendental social renders considerations of intentionality irrelevant lacks coherence, and (iv) the extension of their explanatory account to the moral dumfounding of American students in Haidt’s well-known scenario of intentional incest is unwarranted.
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