The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-prot purposes provided that:• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source • a link is made to the metadata record in DRO • the full-text is not changed in any way The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.Please consult the full DRO policy for further details. Pre-proof version.Abstract: This paper aims to bring clarity to the term topology as it has been deployed in human geography. We summarize the insights that geographers have garnered from thinking topologically about space and power. We find that many deployments of topology both overstretch topology's conceptual merit and limit its insights for spatial thinking. We show how topology, with its structuralist and modernist baggage, requires some theoretical reworking to be put to work by poststructuralist geographers. Our purpose is not to consolidate a specific topological approach for geographers, but to call for an ongoing consideration of what topology offers poststructuralist spatial theories.

This article surveys the state of emerging geographic research on detention, imprisonment, and confinement. Prisons and detention centers vary widely in location and form, but all hold human beings without consent by other human beings. We first survey geographical research on prisons and, second, on detention centers. We then argue that this geographic research offers three primary contributions to the study of imprisonment and detention. First, analyzing the spatial practices (the ordering of space and time) of these institutions provides a productive framework for understanding the materiality of social, cultural, and economic relationships. Second, this research provides an important perspective on state responses to the globalization of trade, migration, war, and security. Third, detention and imprisonment are productive sites for exclusionary discourses. In closing, we urge geographers to think deeply about how detention's indeterminacy works beyond the detention center, to be wary of implicit valorizations of imprisonment, and to take seriously the global expansion of the confinement industry.

No abstract

No abstract

Critical security scholars have argued that biometric identity technologies, databanking, digital surveillance, and risk analysis reveal not a blockaded boundary but a border that follows transboundary migrants as they move within and between national territories. Managed through risk-based technologies, this networked, contingent border respatialises inclusion and exclusion, forming a border that is potentially everywhere and nowhere in particular. At the same time, immigration scholars have shown how immigration authorities deploy policing, inspection, and identification practices both within and beyond territorial boundaries, making life increasingly uncertain for noncitizens. In the US, Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) authority to detain noncitizens has become a key spatial strategy in domestic counter-terrorism, interior immigration enforcement and border securitisation. Thus, transboundary migration and state responses to it trouble analytic distinctions between domestic and foreign policy, immigration and national security, the border and the interior. This paper builds on recent work in immigration geopolitics to analyse how detention, in particular, works to contain individual migrants and deter future migrants. Focusing on noncitizen family detention, this article situates US noncitizen detention in a broader milieu of pre-9/11 US immigration enforcement law and post-9/11 security practices. I then analyse how detention congeals a number of spatial strategies -remoteness, isolation, spatial ordering, inter-centre transfers, and criminalisation -that work to destabilise migrants' support networks. Modulated with digitised border and identity 313 surveillance technologies, detention foregrounds the persistence of disciplinary tactics in risk-dominated security regimes.

Familial relations: spaces, subjects, and politics`F amilies matter. Irresponsibility. Selfishness. Behaving as if your choices have no consequences. Children without fathers. Schools without discipline. Reward without effort. Crime without punishment. Rights without responsibilities. Communities without control. ... But I repeat today, as I have on many occasions these last few years, that the reason I am in politics is to build a bigger, stronger society. Stronger families. Stronger communities. A stronger society. ... [I]f we want to have any hope of mending our broken society, family and parenting is where we've got to start.'' David Cameron, Monday 15 August 2011 (1) Following rioting in some parts of England in August 2011, British Prime Minister David Cameron asserted that``families matter''.``Broken'' families, he suggested, were a primary cause of the social disorder that provoked the riots. Fatherless families, negligent or ineffectual parents, families``that everyone in their neighbourhood knows and often avoids'' required government intervention, in order to get the nation back on track. Restoring orderly families led to the creation of a``family test'' by which all social policy initiatives would be judged by their effect on the family, but also more police, less bureaucratic red tape, more education, and a restoration of morality in politics. Britain's``security fightback'' must work in tandem with its``social fightback'', Cameron asserted, because social disorder threatens the security of a``great country of good people''. Cameron's speech can be read as an iteration of a familiar conservative reprisalö family values, personal responsibility, strong policing. The family has been a target of state intervention since states began to perceive and orient themselves towards a society. As Donzelot (1979, page 92) argued, creating social order by managing the family was a primary concern in early liberal statecraft. Consequently, the problems of the liberal state were defined around forms of familial intervention, and the family linked individuals to a series of state and nonstate institutions (see Martin, 2012). Most state governmentsöliberal, social democratic, socialist, authoritarian, and otherwiseöcontinue to distribute social citizenship benefits through family-making practices like marriage, childbirth, and care. Immigration policies privilege biological kinship and heteronormative family forms (Simmons, 2008) and familial gender roles often circumscribe women's migration (Yeoh et al, 2005). Yet employment-based migration schemes often require long-term family separation (Graham et al, 2012;Pratt 2004;2009). Nations, citizenship, and states are made in, through, and on behalf of families.So, clearly families do matter. But we also want to ask what makes a family? And if there are many answers to this question, then how exactly do families come to matter, in what ways? Where, when, and to whom do families matter? While geographers have provided rich analyses of gender, social reproduction, and ca...

This article conceptualizes carceral economies of migration control. First, I argue that ‘privatization’ signals a reorganization of authority, rather than a relocation of ownership from public to private domains. Second, I argue for greater attention to the socio-technical practices of valuation specific to migration control through which commodification becomes possible. Third, this reorganization of authority has produced (1) status value, a form of value specific to immigration policing’s juridico-political position; and (2) valuation practices that translate, commensurate and circulate migrant life as a marketizable entity.

The United States Transportation Security Administration (TSA) broadcasts the following warning in airports around the country: 'Making jokes or statements regarding bombs and/or threats during the screening process may be grounds for both civil and criminal penalties and could cause you to miss your flight.' Despite the warning, people continue to be arrested for making jokes about bombs, anthrax, and security policy. This paper examines the persistence of these disciplinary mechanisms in the context of the deterritorialized risk analysis, biometric identity banking, and 'network thinking' that characterize state security regimes. The article first describes how TSA has incorporated theories of complex adaptive systems, networks, and emergence into its strategy. Second, I trace how air travelers move through a series of risk analysis and inspection practices. By combining passenger pre-screening, check-in, visual inspection and 'behavior observation,' TSA seeks to surveil different spatiotemporal slices of passengers' identities, belongings, and future plans. Third, the article situates the banning of the bomb joke in the context of information-driven inspection practices and unpacks the interpretive practices of TSA staff. Finally, I argue that spatial orders are produced in and through the embodied performance of speech, and further, that disciplining speech points to enduring anxieties about the 'securitized subject' in post-9/11 security regimes.