In 3 experiments, the authors examined mathematical problem solving performance under pressure. In Experiment 1, pressure harmed performance on only unpracticed problems with heavy working memory demands. In Experiment 2, such high-demand problems were practiced until their answers were directly retrieved from memory. This eliminated choking under pressure. Experiment 3 dissociated practice on particular problems from practice on the solution algorithm by imposing a high-pressure test on problems practiced 1, 2, or 50 times each. Infrequently practiced high-demand problems were still performed poorly under pressure, whereas problems practiced 50 times each were not. These findings support distraction theories of choking in math, which contrasts with considerable evidence for explicit monitoring theories of choking in sensorimotor skills. This contrast suggests a skill taxonomy based on real-time control structures.

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In two experiments, we explored how novice and expert athletes represent the everyday and sportspecific objects and actions that they read about. Novice and expert ice hockey players (Experiment 1) and football players (Experiment 2) read sentences describing everyday or sport-specific situations and then judged whether a pictured item (either matching the action implied in the previous sentence or not) was mentioned in the preceding sentence. The sentences in Experiment 1 consisted of everyday and hockey-specific scenarios. The sentences in Experiment 2 depicted football scenarios implying football-specific or non-football-specific actions anyone might perform. Everyone responded most quickly to items that matched the sentence-implied actions for everyday and non-sport-specific actions. Only athletes showed this effect for their respective sport-specific scenarios. Differentiating between the same item in different action orientations is thought to be driven by embodied knowledge containing the sensorimotor characteristics of what one is reading about. We show that possessing this type of representation depends on experience interacting with objects and performing the actions in question.

Can covert sensorimotor simulation of stimulus-relevant actions influence affective judgments, even when there is no intention to act? Skilled and novice typists picked which of two letter dyads they preferred. In each pair, one dyad, if typed using standard typing methods, would involve the same fingers (e.g., FV); the other would be typed with different fingers (e.g., FJ). Thus, if typed, dyads of the former kind should create more motor interference than dyads of the latter kind. Although individuals could not explain how the dyads differed, skilled typists preferred those typed with different fingers. Novices showed no preference. Moreover, a motor task performed while making dyad preference judgments attenuated skilled typists' preference--but only when the motor task involved the specific fingers that would be used to type the dyads. These findings suggest that in skilled typists, perceiving letters prompts covert sensorimotor simulation of typing them, which in turn influences affective judgments about this information.

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