Cognitive control processes that enable purposeful behavior are often context-specific. A teenager, for example, may inhibit the tendency to daydream at work but not in the classroom. However, the nature of contextual boundaries for cognitive control processes remains unclear. Therefore, we revisited an ongoing controversy over whether such boundaries reflect (a) an attentional reset that occurs whenever a context-defining (e.g., sensory) feature changes or (b) a disruption of episodic memory retrieval that occurs only when the updated context-defining feature is linked to a different task set. To distinguish between these hypotheses, we used a cross-modal distractor-interference task to determine precisely when changing a salient context-defining feature-the sensory modality in which task stimuli appearbounds control processes underlying the congruency sequence effect (CSE). Consistent with the task set hypothesis, but not with the attentional reset hypothesis, Experiments 1 and 2 revealed that changing the sensory modality in which task stimuli appear eliminates the CSE only when the task structure enables participants to form modality-specific task sets. Experiment 3 further revealed that such "modalityspecific" CSEs are associated with orienting attention to the sensory modality in which task stimuli appear, which may facilitate the formation of a modality-specific task set. These findings support the view that task sets serve as boundaries for the CSE. Public Significance StatementCognitive control processes that enable purposeful behavior are often context-specific. For example, a child who recruits control to avoid getting into a fight in the classroom may not recruit such control on the playground. In the present study, we investigated the nature of such "contextual boundaries" for control. We found that these boundaries reflect switching between distinct task sets that form when control processes assign different context-defining features to different events or episodes, rather than switching between the features themselves. This finding informs an ongoing controversy regarding the boundaries of cognitive control.

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Adaptive control processes that minimize distraction often operate in a context-specific manner. For example, they may minimize distraction from irrelevant conversations during a lecture but not in the hallway afterwards. It remains unclear, however, whether (a) salient perceptual features or (b) task sets based on such features serve as contextual boundaries for adaptive control in standard distractor-interference tasks. To distinguish between these possibilities, we manipulated whether the structure of a standard, visual distractor-interference task allowed (Experiment 1) or did not allow (Experiment 2) participants to associate salient visual features (i.e., color patches and color words) with different task sets. We found that changing salient visual features across consecutive trials reduced a popular measure of adaptive control in distractor-interference tasks – the congruency sequence effect (CSE) – only when the task structure allowed participants to associate these visual features with different task sets. These findings extend prior support for the task set hypothesis from somewhat atypical cross-modal tasks to a standard unimodal task. Conversely, they pose a challenge to an alternative “attentional reset” hypothesis, and related views, wherein changing salient perceptual features always results in a contextual boundary for the CSE.

According to most accounts of executive control, resisting distraction requires enhancing task-relevant processing, reducing task-irrelevant processing, or both. Consistent with this view, the congruency effect in Stroop-like tasks-a putative measure of distraction-is often smaller after highly distracting incongruent trials than after less distracting congruent trials. Competing accounts of executive control, however, differ on which aspect of an incongruent trial triggers this congruency sequence effect (CSE). The account posits the activation of an incorrect response. In contrast, the account posits identifying stimuli that cue multiple responses. To distinguish between these accounts, we conducted 2 experiments involving a modified prime-probe task wherein participants respond to the distracter in occasional catch trials. We found that the CSE is triggered by identifying stimuli that cue multiple responses, rather than by the activation of an incorrect response. Further, we observed this effect while ruling out an alternative "response conflict" trigger. These findings are more consistent with the response cueing account than with the activation-suppression account. (PsycINFO Database Record

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