Relational exchange arrangements supported by trust are commonly viewed as substitutes for complex contracts in interorganizational exchanges. Many argue that formal contracts actually undermine trust and thereby encourage the opportunistic behavior they are designed to discourage. In this paper, we develop and test an alternative perspective: that formal contracts and relational governance function as complements. Using data from a sample of information service exchanges, we find empirical support for this proposition of complementarity. Managers appear to couple their increasingly customized contracts with high levels of relational governance (and vice versa). Moreover, this interdependence underlies their ability to generate improvements in exchange performance. Our results concerning the determinants of these governance choices show their distinct origins, which further augments their complementarity in practice. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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This research focuses on relational and contractual mechanisms and examines their impact on foreign subsidiaries' acquisition of tacit and explicit knowledge from local suppliers. Using survey data from 168 foreign subsidiaries operating in China, this study finds broad support for the proposed analytical framework. When the foreign subsidiary and supplier share common goals, the foreign subsidiary acquires greater levels of both explicit and tacit knowledge; trust between the two parties promotes the acquisition of greater levels of tacit than explicit knowledge. However, access to the local supplier network through the focal supplier enables the foreign subsidiary to acquire greater levels of explicit but not tacit knowledge. Formal contracts play a complementary role in knowledge acquisition: contracts enhance the acquisition of explicit knowledge and further strengthen the effects of relational mechanisms on tacit and explicit knowledge acquisition. Overall, these findings provide important implications for foreign subsidiaries regarding how to acquire local knowledge in host countries through both formal and informal mechanisms. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Building on institutional and transaction cost economics, this article proposes that legal enforceability increases the use of contract over relational reliability (e.g. beliefs that the other party acts in a non-opportunistic manner) to safeguard market exchanges characterized by nontrivial hazards. The results of 399 buyer-supplier exchanges in China show that 1) when managers perceive that the legal system can protect their firm's interests, they tend to use explicit contracts rather than relational reliability to safeguard transactions involving risks (i.e. asset specificity, environmental uncertainty, and behavioral uncertainty), and 2) when managers do not perceive the legal system as credible, they are less likely to use contracts and instead rely on relational reliability to safeguard transactions associated with specialized assets and environmental uncertainty, but not those involving behavioral uncertainty. We further find that legal enforceability does not moderate the effect of relational reliability on contracts, but does weaken the effect of contracts on relational reliability. These results endorse the importance of prior experience (e.g., relational reliability) in supporting the use of explicit contracts, and alternatively suggest under conditions of greater legal enforceability, the contract signals less regarding one's intention to be trustworthy but more about the efficacy of sanctions.