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This article critically reviews theories of global economic networks and refines their application to China’s state-controlled financial sector. Current approaches view global production networks and global financial networks (GFNs) through an agency focus on inter-firm relations and a structural emphasis on neoliberal forces. This market-driven perspective exposes several shortcomings when it comes to understanding the governance of GFNs in China. In the Chinese context, these networks are characterized by complex bargaining that bridges different levels of the Chinese party-state and corporate interests. This article exploits the theoretical synergies between economic geography and theories of Chinese elite politics and institutional change to develop a politically sensitive reading of GFNs. It identifies channels through which multilevel bargaining in the Chinese party-state shapes the competitive positions of firms. By integrating recent findings on Chinese cross-border finance, the article develops an empirically grounded theoretical approach of GFNs ‘with Chinese characteristics’. This opens up a promising research agenda in the GFN literature on the role of the state as an architect and entrepreneur behind GFNs and the outcomes they produce.

The commentaries on this forum’s anchor article, ‘China’s Integration into the Global Financial System: Toward a State-led Conception of Global Financial Networks’, examine how the state is shaping global financial networks (GFNs). In response to these reviews, this article discusses three common themes that bind the different commentaries: (1) different types of agency, power, and the rise of new actors; (2) the methodology behind studying state-led GFNs; and (3) the structural question of ‘Chinese exceptionalism’ as a mode of capitalism. Overall, this article affirms that the state remains central to our understanding of competitive hierarchies and firm behavior in financial networks.

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