Digital authoritarianism threatens the privacy and rights of Internet users worldwide, yet scholarship on this topic remains limited in analytical power and case selection. In this article, we introduce a comprehensive analytical framework to the field of Internet governance and apply it first, briefly, to the well-known case of China and then, in more depth, to the still-understudied Russian case. We identify the extent and relative centralization of Internet governance as well as proactive versus reactive approaches to governance as notable differences between the cases, highlighting variation among digital authoritarians’ governance strategies. We conclude that Russia’s Internet governance model is less comprehensive and consistent than China’s, but its components may be more easily exported to other political systems. We then consider whether recent changes to Russia’s Internet governance suggest that it could converge with the Chinese model over time.
Why would anyone cultivate weeds? Alfarabi’s The Political Regime prompts this unexpected question. There Alfarabi uses a horticultural metaphor inherited from Plato to describe his ideal regime. His imagined polity is a garden beset by weeds, which threaten to choke the life out of the other plants. Although most of these weeds are to be eradicated for the sake of the garden that is his ideal regime, Alfarabi proposes to cultivate one variety. This kind of weed challenges the official doctrines of the regime. Since the regime is based on false teachings about the universe, such debunking questioning poses a series threat. Yet alfarabi proposes to indulge and encourage the doubts of these weeds. In this paper, we explore the reasons for Alfarabi’s strange treatment of these dissidents. We argue that Alfarabi’s proposal reflects an important disagreement with his teacher, Plato, about the extent to which an ideal model ought to be tethered to reality. Our argument helps to illuminate one of the more perplexing aspects of Alfarabi’s political thought and his relationship with Plato. Most broadly, we show that we will miss important contributions to ideal theory if we fail to appreciate that what constitutes “ideal” may vary widely.
Research on Russian civil society focuses largely on the repressive legislative side of state policies, to the virtual exclusion of the rise of domestic funding, be it individual, corporate, or public. This article instead contributes to the discussion of state funding for the third sector by looking at the Russian Presidential Grant Fund, a state institution that has disbursed RUB18 billion (approx. $275 million at the August 11, 2019, exchange rate) to the third sector since 2016, making it one of the most influential sources of financial support to Russian civil society. A data-driven analysis of the Fund reveals that, although it prioritizes certain types of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) over others, there is a discernible attempt to address some of the most pressing social ills in Russia today. Whereas some grant directions, such as the “preservation of historical memory” and “development of public diplomacy and support of compatriots,” further long-held, Kremlin-sponsored ideological projects, the biggest categories supported by the Fund focus on more classical philanthropic issues, confirming the state’s growing delegation of the provision of public services to the third sector.
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