Since the administration of synthetic medicines is associated with drug resistance and undesired side effects, utilization of natural compounds could be an alternative and complementary modality to inhibit or prevent the development of tumors. Epigallocatechin 3-O-gallate (EGCG, 1), the major flavan component of green tea, and genistein (2), a soy isoflavonoid, are known to have chemopreventive and chemotherapeutic effects against cancer. This study demonstrated that both flavonoids inhibit cell proliferation, an effect enhanced under serum-free conditions. Compound 1, but not 2, induced downregulation of ErbB1 and ErbB2 in mammary and epidermoid carcinoma cells, and its inhibitory effect on cell viability was mediated by the 67 kDa laminin receptor (67LR). While 1 was superior in inducing cell death, 2 was more efficient in arresting the tumor cells in the G2/M phase. Furthermore, number and brightness analysis revealed that 1 decreased the homoclustering of a lipid raft marker, glycosylphosphatidylinositol-anchored GFP, and it also reduced the co-localization between lipid rafts and 67LR. The main conclusion made is that the primary target of 1 may be the lipid raft component of the plasma membrane followed by secondary changes in the expression of ErbB proteins. Compound 2, on the other hand, must have other unidentified targets.

In this article we argue that the views that Francis Bacon and René Descartes held about the role of experiments in the process of discovery are closer than previously accepted. Looking at the way experiments and the heuristics of experimentation are embedded in Bacon's posthumous History of Dense and Rare and Descartes' Discourses 8, 9, 10 of the Meteorology, we will show that experiments help the investigator both in solving specific problems that could not have otherwise been foreseen and in generating relevant information that advances the scope of the investigation.

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For Margaret Cavendish, every single part of matter has self-knowledge, and almost every part has perceptive knowledge. This paper asks what is at stake for Cavendish in ascribing self-knowing and perceptive properties to matter. Whereas many commentators take perception and self-knowledge to be guides to Cavendish’s epistemology, this paper takes them to be guides to her metaphysics, in that it shows that these categories account for individual specificity and for relationality. A part of matter is a unique individual insofar as it is self-knowing – and it is a part in relation to other parts, and to the whole of matter, insofar as it is a perceptive part. This is so because self-knowledge is purely self-referential and complete, while perceptive knowledge is purely relational.

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