A key prediction of motivational theories of automatic imitation is that people imitate in-group over out-group members. However, research on this topic has provided mixed results. Here, we investigate the possibility that social group modulations emerge only when people can directly compare in- and out-group. To this end, we conducted three experiments in which we measured automatic imitation of two simultaneously shown hands: one in-group and one out-group hand. Our general hypothesis was that the in-group hand would be imitated more than the out-group hand. However, even though both explicit and implicit manipulation checks showed that we succeeded in manipulating participants’ feelings of group membership, we did not find support for the predicted influence of group membership on automatic imitation. In contrast to motivational theories, this suggests that group membership does not influence who we do or do not imitate, not even in a contrastive multi-agent paradigm.

A key prediction of motivational theories of automatic imitation is that people imitate in-group over out-group members. However, research on this topic has provided mixed results. Here, we investigate the possibility that social group modulations emerge only when people can directly compare in- and out-group. To this end, we conducted three experiments in which we measured automatic imitation of two simultaneously shown hands: one in-group and one out-group hand. Our general hypothesis was that the in-group hand would be imitated more than the out-group hand. However, even though both explicit and implicit manipulation checks showed that we succeeded in manipulating participants’ feelings of group membership, we did not find support for the predicted influence of group membership on automatic imitation. In contrast to motivational theories, this suggests that group membership does not influence who we do or do not imitate, not even in a contrastive multi-agent paradigm.

The present study investigated the psychological foundations of the perceived prejudice asymmetry, that is, the observation that members of privileged groups are more likely to consider 'downward' bias-advantaged group members displaying ambiguous intolerant behaviour towards disadvantaged groups-as instances of prejudice than 'upward' bias-disadvantaged group members behaving negatively towards advantaged groups. Specifically, we tested whether a higher moral obligations account could explain these divergent judgements of prejudice. We hypothesised that advantaged witnesses implicitly ascribe higher social power-and hence, elevated moral obligations-to advantaged (compared to disadvantaged) groups. The resulting differential morality judgements, in turn, lead to divergent attributions of prejudice.Five experiments (total N = 1063) provided converging evidence for our predictions, although we also obtained evidence for a reverse causal pathway in which perceived prejudice determines morality judgements. Challenges for other accounts of the perceived prejudice asymmetry are discussed.