In virtual reality (VR), it is possible to embody avatars that are dissimilar to the physical self. We examined whether embodying a dissimilar self in VR would decrease anxiety in a public speaking situation. We report the results of an observational pilot study and two laboratory experiments. In the pilot study (N = 252), participants chose an avatar to use in a public speaking task. Trait public speaking anxiety correlated with avatar preference, such that anxious individuals preferred dissimilar self-representations. In Study 1 (N = 82), differences in anxiety during a speech in front of a virtual audience were compared among participants embodying an assigned avatar whose face was identical to their real self, an assigned avatar whose face was other than their real face, or embodied an avatar of their choice. Anxiety differences were not significant, but there was a trend for lower anxiety with the assigned dissimilar avatar compared to the avatar looking like the real self. Study 2 (N = 105) was designed to explicate that trend, and further investigated anxiety differences with an assigned self or dissimilar avatar. The assigned dissimilar avatar reduced anxiety relative to the assigned self avatar for one measure of anxiety. We discuss implications for theories of self-representation as well as for applied uses of VR to treat social anxiety.

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Bodily self-attribution, the feeling that a body (or parts of it) is owned by me, is a fundamental component of one's self. Previous studies have suggested that, in addition to a necessary multi-sensory stimulation, the sense of body ownership is determined by the body model, a representation of our body in the brain. It is however unclear what features constitute the body representation. To examine this issue, we first briefly review results on embodiment of artificial limbs, whole bodies and virtual avatars to understand the apparent anatomical, volumetric and spatial constraints associated with the sense of ownership toward external entities. We then discuss how considering limb functionality in the body model can provide an integrated explanation for most of the varied embodiment results in literature. We propose that the self-attribution of an entity may be determined, not just by its physical features, but by whether the entity can afford actions that the brain has associated with the limb which it replaces.

We examine whether non-human looking humanoid robot arms can be perceived as part of one's own body. In two subsequent experiments, participants experienced high levels of embodiment of a robotic arm that had a blue end effector with no fingers (Experiment 1) and of a robotic arm that ended with a gripper (Experiment 2) when it was stroked synchronously with the real arm. Levels of embodiment were significantly higher than the corresponding asynchronous condition and similar to those reported for a human-looking arm. Additionally, we found that visuomovement synchronization also induced embodiment of the robot arm and that embodiment was even partially maintained when the robot hand was covered with a blue plastic cover. We conclude that humans are able to experience a strong sense of embodiment towards non-human looking robot arms. The results have important implications for the domains related to robotic embodiment.

Whole-body embodiment studies have shown that synchronized multi-sensory cues can trick a healthy human mind to perceive self-location outside the bodily borders, producing an illusion that resembles an out-of-body experience (OBE). But can a healthy mind also perceive the sense of self in more than one body at the same time? To answer this question, we created a novel artificial reduplication of one's body using a humanoid robot embodiment system. We first enabled individuals to embody the humanoid robot by providing them with audio-visual feedback and control of the robot head movements and walk, and then explored the self-location and self-identification perceived by them when they observed themselves through the embodied robot. Our results reveal that, when individuals are exposed to the humanoid body reduplication, they experience an illusion that strongly resembles heautoscopy, suggesting that a healthy human mind is able to bi-locate in two different bodies simultaneously.

This study assesses the influence of body participation on the sense of presence and emotions, and the relationship between the two dependent variables in playing a group game in a virtual environment. A total of 56 volunteers were asked to play a virtual game in a 360-degree stereoscopic immersive interactive visualization environment using either body movement or a joystick. Presence was measured with the post hoc SUS Presence Questionnaire. The pictorial tool of Self-Assessment Manikin was employed for measuring emotions of arousal and valence. Both arousal and valence positively correlated with presence. However, body participation did not significantly affect reported presence or the above-mentioned emotions.

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