The importance of an investor's organizational structure is increasingly recognized in modern finance. This paper examines the role of banks in the US venture capital market. Theory suggests that unlike independent venture capital firms, banks can seek complementarities between their venture capital and lending activities. Our empirical analysis suggests that banks use their venture capital investments to build relationships for their lending activities. Banks target their venture investments to companies that are more likely to subsequently raise loans, and having made an investment as a venture capitalist increases a bank's likelihood of providing a loan. Companies may benefit from these relationships through more favorable loan pricing. The analysis suggests that banks are strategic investors in the venture capital market with investment patterns distinct from independent venture capitalists. It also provides a cautionary note for relying on banks for the development of a venture capital industry.

This study documents a new value-added role of venture capitalists and addresses important questions about how resources are combined to create firms. As part of the nexus of contracts surrounding a firm, strategic alliances can be viewed as relational contracts that blur firm boundaries. This paper provides evidence that alliances are more frequent among companies sharing a common venture capitalist. The effect is concentrated in alliances in which contracting problems are more pronounced, consistent with venture capitalists utilizing informational and other advantages in providing resources to firms. Further, these alliances improve the probability of exit for venture-backed firms. Copyright (c) 2008 by The American Finance Association.