BackgroundIn primary care, financial incentives have usually been directed to physicians because they are thought to make the key decisions in order to change the functions of a medical organization. There are no studies regarding the impact that directing these incentives to all disciplines of the care team (e.g. group bonuses for both nurses and doctors) may have, despite the low frequency with which diagnoses were being recorded for primary care visits to doctors. This study tested the effect of offering group bonuses to the care teams.MethodsThis was a retrospective quasi-experimental study with before-and-after settings and two control groups. In the intervention group, the mean percentage of visits to a doctor for which a diagnosis was recorded by each individual care team (mean team-based percentage of monthly visits to a doctor with recorded diagnoses) and simultaneously the same data was gathered from two different primary care settings where no team bonuses were applied. To study the sustainability of changes obtained with the group bonuses the respective data were derived from the electronic health record system for 2 years after the cessation of the intervention. The differences in the rate of marking diagnoses was analyzed with ANOVA and RM-ANOVA with appropriate post hoc tests, and the differences in the rate of change in marking diagnoses was analyzed with linear regression followed by t-test.ResultsThe proportion of doctor visits having recorded diagnoses in the teams was about 55 % before starting to use group bonuses and 90 % after this intervention. There was no such increase in control units. The effect of the intervention weakened slightly after cessation of the group bonuses.ConclusionGroup bonuses may provide a method to alter clinical practices in primary care. However, sustainability of these interventions may diminish after ceasing this type of financial incentive.

Introduction We studied whether primary care teams respond to financial group bonuses by improving the recording of diagnoses, whether this intervention leads to diagnoses reflecting the anticipated distribution of diseases, and how the recording of a significant chronic disease, diabetes, alters after the application of these bonuses. Methods We performed an observational register-based retrospective quasi-experimental follow-up study with before-and-after setting and two control groups in primary healthcare of a Finnish town. We studied the rate of recorded diagnoses in visits to general practitioners with interrupted time series analysis. The distribution of these diagnoses was also recorded. Results After group bonuses, the rate of recording diagnoses increased by 17.9% (95% CI: 13.6–22.3) but not in either of the controls (−2.0 to −0.3%). The increase in the rate of recorded diagnoses in the care teams varied between 14.9% (4.7–25.2) and 33.7% (26.6–41.3). The distribution of recorded diagnoses resembled the respective distribution of diagnoses in the former studies of diagnoses made in primary care. The rate of recorded diagnoses of diabetes did not increase just after the intervention. Conclusions In primary care, the completeness of diagnosis recording can be, to varying degrees, influenced by group bonuses without guarantee that recording of clinically significant chronic diseases is improved.

Introduction A playful competition was launched in a primary dental health care system to improve the recording of diagnoses into an electronic patient chart system and to study what diagnoses were used in primary dental care. Methods This was a longitudinal follow-up study with public sector primary dental care practices in a Finnish city. A one-year-lasting playful competition between the dental care teams was launched and the monthly percentage of dentists' visits with recorded diagnosis before, during, and after the intervention was recorded. The assessed diagnoses were recorded with the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-10). Results Before the competition, the level of diagnosis recordings was practically zero. At the end of this intervention, about 25% of the visits had a recorded diagnosis. Two years after the competition, this percentage was 35% without any additional measures. The most frequent diagnoses were dental caries (K02, 38.6%), other diseases of hard tissues of teeth (K03, 14.8%), and diseases of pulp and periapical tissues (K04, 11.4%). Conclusions Commitment to the idea that recording of diagnoses was beneficial improved the recording of dental diagnoses. However, the diagnoses obtained did not accurately reflect the reputed prevalence of oral diseases in the Finnish population.

ObjectiveTo improve the recording of diagnoses in visits to general practitioners, an observational retrospective study based on a before-after design was performed by installing an electronic reminder in the computerized patient chart system, reinforced in feedback delivered in superior-subordinate or development discussions with the general practitioners. The monthly rate of recording diagnoses was observed before and after the intervention. The effect of this intervention on recording of diagnoses was compared with the effects of financial group bonuses on the same parameter in a neighbouring city.ResultsBefore intervention, the level of recording diagnoses was about 45% in the primary care units. Nine months after this intervention there was not yet any statistically significant increase in recording of diagnoses but after 21 months it yielded a recording rate of 90% (P < 0.001). In three years, this percentage reached level over 95%. Group bonuses, a financial incentive serving as a control intervention, increased this parameter from 50 to 80% (P < 0.001) in nine months, and in 21 months the level of recording diagnoses was 90%. The both methods increased the level of recording diagnoses at the same level. Group bonuses acted faster but were also more expensive.

The INR-control has a significant impact on the warfarin treatment costs. The choice of model influences the estimated mean costs. In addition, different models identify statistically significant effects between different background variables and costs.