Traditionally, empirical assessment of local government financial autonomy has concentrated on the different income sources available to local governments. In this article we extend such evaluation to the expenditure autonomy side and combine these two dimensions of autonomy into a comprehensive evaluation of local government financial autonomy. The operationalization of financial autonomy offers a basis for an evaluation of the consistency of central government policy towards local governments. Our approach is then used for a comparison of two countries — Finland and Poland. Points for practitioners Key implications in our approach are the systematic evaluation of both income and expenditure autonomy of local governments, and combining these two dimensions of autonomy into a comprehensive evaluation of local government financial autonomy. The measurement of financial autonomy which is developed can be used as a management tool in central government policy towards local governments.
Purpose -This paper aims to explore the emergence of accounting shared service centers (SSCs) in the municipal sector. Design/methodology/approach -The theoretical framework of this interpretative study draws on institutional entrepreneurship that highlights the importance of actors and agency for institutions and institutional change. Findings -The paper finds that institutional entrepreneurs operate on many institutional levels simultaneously. On the organizational field level they must find groups of actors with whom they share interests. At the organizational level the institutional entrepreneurs must find and recognize critical audiences that are receptive to their agenda. Research limitations/implications -The authors' data comprise interviews and archival data; they were not present to observe the institutional entrepreneurs in action. Originality/value -The paper contributes to the accounting literature by investigating institutional entrepreneurship at the organizational field level, which has not been much empirically researched.
This study explores the effects of governance structure and contracting out on municipal audit costs. There is economy of scale, asymmetric information and human asset specificity in municipal auditing. As a consequence, both unified governance and market contracting could result in high total audit costs for municipalities. According to Oliver Williamson, relational contracting has been a neglected issue in transaction costs analysis (TCA). We studied 47 municipalities in Finland and 298 municipalities in Norway using multivariate analysis. The municipal audit fees per capita were highest in Norway where the municipal audit market was regulated and had virtually no market contracting. The audit fees per capita increased most in Finland, possibly due to lowballing after the Finnish market was deregulated in 1997. The municipalities in both Finland and Norway predominantly used audit in relational contracting even though the audit fees per capita were relatively high. Relational contracting could be efficient when production, transaction and political costs are taken into account. The findings corroborated several core TCA propositions.
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