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In order to explore the optimal taxation of low-skilled labor, we extend the standard model of optimal non-linear income taxation in the presence of quasi-linear preferences in leisure by allowing for involuntary unemployment, job search and an exogenous welfare benefit. In trading off lowskilled employment against work effort of higher skilled workers, the government balances distortions on the search margin with those on work effort. Higher welfare benefits typically reduce taxes paid by low-skilled workers and raise marginal tax rates throughout the skill distribution. The optimal taxation of unskilled labor with job search and social assistance * Jan Boone † and Lans Bovenberg ‡ 21-04-2003Abstract In order to explore the optimal taxation of low-skilled labor, we extend the standard model of optimal non-linear income taxation in the presence of quasi-linear preferences in leisure by allowing for involuntary unemployment, job search and an exogenous welfare benefit. In trading off low-skilled employment against work effort of higher skilled workers, the government balances distortions on the search margin with those on work effort. Higher welfare benefits typically reduce taxes paid by low-skilled workers and raise marginal tax rates throughout the skill distribution.J.E.L. codes: H2, J2

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SummaryThis paper surveys the academic literature on optimal saving and investment over an individual's life cycle. We start out with a simple benchmark model with separable and smooth preferences, one aggregate risk factor and riskless wage income. Within this simple setting, optimal saving and investment behavior are explored from the perspective of individuals. Subsequently, we investigate various constraints to optimal individual decision making. We discuss how collective pension schemes may help to relieve some of the market incompleteness that arises from these constraints while at the same time introducing new types of constraints. Finally, various extensions to the benchmark setting are analyzed: a more elaborate modelling of human capital, additional risk factors, and other types of preferences.