In a 1997 paper, Borenstein, Cameron, and Gilbert (BCG) claim that gasoline prices rise quickly following an increase in the price of crude oil, but fall slowly following a decrease. This note estimates an error-correction model with daily spot gasoline and crude-oil price data over the period 1985-1998 and finds no evidence of asymmetry in wholesale gasoline prices. The sources of the difference in results are twofold. First, we use the standard Engle-Granger two-step estimation procedure, whereas BCG used a nonstandard estimation methodology. Second, even using BCG's nonstandard specification, the use of daily rather than weekly data yields little evidence of price asymmetry. © 2003 President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Prompted by the contemporaneous spike in coal, oil, and natural gas prices, this paper evaluates the degree of market integration both within and between crude oil, coal, and natural gas markets. Our approach yields parameters that can be readily tested against a priori conjectures. Using daily price data for five very different crude oils, we conclude that the world oil market is a single, highly integrated economic market. On the other hand, coal prices at five trading locations across the United States are cointegrated, but the degree of market integration is much weaker, particularly between Western and Eastern coals. Finally, we show that crude oil, coal, and natural gas markets are only very weakly integrated. Our results indicate that there is not a primary energy market. Despite current price peaks, it is not useful to think of a primary energy market, except in a very long run context.

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This paper uses disaggregate U.S. inflation data to evaluate explanations for the breakdown of the relationship between oil price shocks and consumer price inflation. A data set with measures of inflation, energy intensity, labor intensity, and sensitivity to monetary policy is constructed for 97 sectors that make up core CPI inflation. A comparison of the 1973–85 and 1986–2006 time periods reveals that substitution away from energy use in production and monetary policy were both important, with approximately two‐thirds of the change in response of inflation to oil shocks being due to reduced energy usage, and one‐third to monetary policy. We find no evidence that other factors, such as changes in wage rigidities or changes in the persistence of oil shocks, played a role.