SUMMARYOut-of-pocket (OOP) payments are the principal means of financing health care throughout much of Asia. We estimate the magnitude and distribution of OOP payments for health care in fourteen countries and territories accounting for 81% of the Asian population. We focus on payments that are catastrophic, in the sense of severely disrupting household living standards, and approximate such payments by those absorbing a large fraction of household resources. Bangladesh, China, India, Nepal and Vietnam rely most heavily on OOP financing and have the highest incidence of catastrophic payments. Sri Lanka, Thailand and Malaysia stand out as low to middle income countries that have constrained both the OOP share of health financing and the catastrophic impact of direct payments. In most low/middle-income countries, the better-off are more likely to spend a large fraction of total household resources on health care. This may reflect the inability of the poorest of the poor to divert resources from other basic needs and possibly the protection of the poor from user charges offered in some countries. But in China, Kyrgyz and Vietnam, where there are no exemptions of the poor from charges, they are as, or even more, likely to incur catastrophic payments.

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The article compares the incidence of public healthcare across 11 Asian countries and provinces, testing the dominance of healthcare concentration curves against an equal distribution and Lorenz curves and across countries. The analysis reveals that the distribution of public healthcare is prorich in most developing countries. That distribution is avoidable, but a propoor incidence is easier to realize at higher national incomes. The experiences of Malaysia, Sri Lanka, and Thailand suggest that increasing the incidence of propoor healthcare requires limiting the use of user fees, or protecting the poor effectively from them, and building a wide network of health facilities. Economic growth may not only relax the government budget constraint on propoor policies but also increase propoor incidence indirectly by raising richer individuals' demand for private sector alternatives. JEL Codes: H22, H42, H51.

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