International audienceIn component-based safety-critical real-time systems it is crucial to determine which com-ponent(s) caused the violation of a required system-level safety property, be it to issue a precise alert, or to determine liability of component providers. In this paper we present an approach for blaming in real-time systems whose component specifications are given as timed automata. The analysis is based on a single execution trace violating a safety property P. We formalize blaming using counterfactual reasoning ("what would have been the outcome if component C had behaved correctly?") to distinguish component failures that actually con-tributed to the outcome from failures that had no impact on the violation of P. We then show how to effectively implement blaming by reducing it to a model-checking problem for timed automata, and demonstrate the feasibility of our approach on the models of a pacemaker and of a chemical reactor
Abstract. In this paper we address the state space explosion problem inherent to model-checking timed systems with a large number of components. The main challenge is to obtain pertinent global timing constraints from the timings in the components alone. To this end, we make use of auxiliary clocks to automatically generate new invariants which capture the constraints induced by the synchronisations between components. The method has been implemented as an extension of the D-Finder tool and successfully experimented on several benchmarks.
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