This article examines the way that "sanist" attitudes (attitudes driven by the same kind of irrational, unconscious and bias-driven stereotypes exhibited in racist and sexist decisionmaking) lead to "pretextual" decisions (in which dishonest testimony is either explicitly or implicitly accepted) in mental disability law jurisprudence. In conjunction with these sanist ends, social science data is teleologically employed by legal decisionmakers, so that it is privileged when it supports a conclusion that the fact-finder wishes to reach but subordinated when it questions such a conclusion. The article examines recent Supreme Court cases in an effort to determine the extent of domination of such sanist behavior, and concludes by offering several prescriptions to scholars and policymakers so as to best avoid sanism's pernicious power.

This article examines the ways that power imbalances affect relationships in the forensic mental disability system and between therapists and their clients. It considers the impact o f the "dual loyalty" dilemma on forensic relationships, the manner in which courts deal with this dilemma, and suggests several points of commonality that arise around such power conflicts. It also examines recent litigation involving therapeutic relationships, and attempts to extract doctrinal threads from these cases. Finally, it recommends that, in order for the judicial system to attempt to correct any of the underlying imbalances, courts and jurors must openly come to grips with the psychodynamic issues that underlie these imbalances.

Little attention has been paid to the question of the right of the mentally disabled to voluntary mental health services in community settings. This article examines the case law, the social context in which the important cases arose, the expected impact of the recent passage of the Americans With Disabilities Act, and the applications of therapeutic jurisprudence principles to the underlying questions.

Scholars have carefully considered all aspects of the incompetency to stand trial process, questions involving incompetency to confess, questions involving incompetency to be executed, and, to a lesser extent, questions related to incompetency to plead guilty or to waive counsel, but little attention has been paid to the relationship between incompetency and the full range of other criminal procedure issues: sentencing, appeals, consent to searches, and others. This article discusses this range of issues, assesses the factors relied upon by courts in deciding these cases and attempts to offer an agenda for future scholarly developments in this area.

There has been little consideration, in either the caselaw or the scholarly literature, of the potential impact of neuroimaging on cases assessing whether a seriously mentally disabled death row defendant is competent to be executed. The Supreme Court's 2007 decision in Panetti v. Quarterman significantly expanded its jurisprudence by ruling that such a defendant had a constitutional right to make a showing that his mental illness "obstruct[ed] a rational understanding of the State's reason for his execution." This article considers the impact of neuroimaging testimony on post-Panetti competency determination hearings, and looks at multiple questions of admissibility of evidence, adequacy of counsel, availability of expert assistance, juror attitudes, trial tactics, and application of the Daubert doctrine, and also considers the implications of the lesser-known Panetti holding (that enhances the role of expert witnesses in all competency-to-be-executed inquiries). It warns that the power of the testimony in question has the capacity to inappropriately affect fact-finders in ways that may lead "to outcomes that are both factually and legally inaccurate and constitutionally flawed."