Despite the assumed prevalence of risk-taking behavior in adolescence, the laboratory evidence of risk taking remains scarce, and the individual variation poorly understood. Drawing from neuroscience studies, we tested whether risk and reward orientation are influenced by the perspective that adolescents take when making risky decisions. Perspective taking was manipulated by cuing participants prior to each choice whether the decision was made for "self," or from the perspective of an "other" (the experimenter in Experiment 1; a hypothetical peer in Experiment 2). In Experiment 1, we show a developmental decrease in risk-taking behavior across different stages of adolescence. In addition, all age groups made fewer risky choices for the experimenter, but the difference between self and other was larger in early adolescence. In Experiment 2, we show that high sensation-seeking (SS) adolescents make more risky choices than low SS adolescents, but both groups make a similar differentiation for other individuals (low risk-taking or high risk-taking peers). Together, the results show that younger adolescents and high SS adolescents make more risky choices for themselves, but can appreciate that others may make fewer risky choices. The developmental change toward more rational decisions versus emotional, impulsive decisions may reflect, in part, more efficient integration of others' perspectives into one's decision making. These developmental results are discussed regarding brain systems important for risk taking and perspective taking.

Dijksterhuis and van Knippenberg (1998) reported that participants primed with a category associated with intelligence ("professor") subsequently performed 13% better on a trivia test than participants primed with a category associated with a lack of intelligence ("soccer hooligans"). In two unpublished replications of this study designed to verify the appropriate testing procedures, Dijksterhuis, van Knippenberg, and Holland observed a smaller difference between conditions (2%-3%) as well as a gender difference: Men showed the effect (9.3% and 7.6%), but women did not (0.3% and -0.3%). The procedure used in those replications served as the basis for this multilab Registered Replication Report. A total of 40 laboratories collected data for this project, and 23 of these laboratories met all inclusion criteria. Here we report the meta-analytic results for those 23 direct replications (total N = 4,493), which tested whether performance on a 30-item general-knowledge trivia task differed between these two priming conditions (results of supplementary analyses of the data from all 40 labs, N = 6,454, are also reported). We observed no overall difference in trivia performance between participants primed with the "professor" category and those primed with the "hooligan" category (0.14%) and no moderation by gender.

a b s t r a c tPeople generally prefer to have the opportunity to revise their decisions. Surprisingly however, research has shown that keeping one's options open yields lower satisfaction with the decision outcome (Gilbert & Ebert, 2002). Two studies aimed to gain more insight into the detrimental consequences of decision reversibility and the cognitive processes underlying decision reversibility. Building upon literature on goal fulfillment we hypothesized and found in a first experiment that as long as decisions are still open to change, accessibility of decision-related constructs is increased compared to neutral constructs. A second experiment demonstrated that decision reversibility undermines working memory capacity. Moreover participants experienced higher regret after having made a reversible decision, an effect that was mediated by decreased working memory capacity. The study set implies that reversible decisions yield lower working memory capacity because people continue to think about the, still relevant, choice options. In the end this might increase dissatisfaction with the decision and regret.

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The present research examined how decision reversibility can affect motivation. On the basis of extant findings, it was suggested that 1 way it could affect motivation would be to strengthen different regulatory foci, with reversible decision making, compared to irreversible decision making, strengthening prevention-related motivation relatively more than promotion-related motivation. If so, then decision reversibility should have effects associated with the relative differences between prevention and promotion motivation. In 5 studies, we manipulated the reversibility of a decision and used different indicators of regulatory focus motivation to test these predictions. Specifically, Study 1 tested for differences in participants' preference for approach versus avoidance strategies toward a desired end state. In Study 2, we used speed and accuracy performance as indicators of participants' regulatory motivation, and in Study 3, we measured global versus local reaction time performance. In Study 4, we approached the research question in a different way, making use of the value-from-fit hypothesis (Higgins, 2000, 2002). We tested whether a fit between chronic regulatory focus and focus induced by the reversibility of the decision increased participants' subjective positive feelings about the decision outcome. Finally, in Study 5, we tested whether regulatory motivation, induced by decision reversibility, also influenced participants' preference in specific product features. The results generally support our hypothesis showing that, compared to irreversible decisions, reversible decisions strengthen a prevention focus more than a promotion focus. Implications for research on decision making are discussed.