Using a sample consisting of China's listed manufacturing companies which issue A-shares on the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges from 2008-2014, this study empirically tests the relationship between board chairman's political connections and the amount of energy conservation and emission reduction investment. The results show that the existence of politically-connected board chairmen positively affects green investment. In addition, marketization degrees negatively moderate the relationship between political connection and green investment, which supports an institutional logic perspective. The amount of redundant resources also has the same moderating effect, which is consistent with the resource exchange perspective.
Purpose This study aims to examine the relationship between an ownership structure with multiple large shareholders and corporate social responsibility (CSR) with regard to Chinese-listed companies. Design/methodology/approach Multiple regression analysis was used on 4,940 samples of 884 listed companies in China for the period 2009–2017, to empirically test the influence of an ownership structure on enterprises’ fulfillment of social responsibility. Moreover, the propensity score matching–difference in differences and Heckman two-stage approaches were used for the robustness of the regression results. Findings The results show that ownership structures with multiple large shareholders can promote social responsibility. The check-and-balance ability of non-controlling large shareholders, corporate information transparency and corporate system environment moderate the relationship between multiple large shareholders and CSR engagement. Originality/value This paper complements prior studies on the ownership structure of multiple large shareholders. The findings enrich the literature on corporate governance and CSR. The results also reveal information about the situational factors, helping identify the mechanism through which the ownership structure of multiple large shareholders affects CSR.
As China's capital market has become more and more developed, listed companies have begun to establish some anti-takeover provisions to protect their controlling right. Existing studies have examined the consequences of the establishment of such provisions. However, few studies have explored how these provisions affect corporate strategic change. Based on agency theory and prospect theory, this paper proposes two channels through which one of the anti-takeover provisions, staggered board provision, impacts strategic change. Using the data of China's listed companies which issue A-shares in Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges from 2007 to 2014, these two channels are tested. We find that the existence of a staggered board provision negatively affects the extent of strategic change. In addition, if governance mechanisms restrict directors' power, the relationship between staggered board provision and strategic change will be weakened, which supports the agency theory. If the listed company is faced with a more dynamic external environment, the relationship between staggered board provision and strategic change will be stronger, which supports the prospect theory. These results are robust after we use a different method to measure strategic change. Our conclusions not only enrich literature about strategic change and anti-takeover provisions, but also are helpful for improving corporate governance in China and other developing countries.
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