Over the last decade, the international relations field witnessed a surge in literature dealing with the concept of identity, a trend that is likely to continue. At the same time, the multi‐directional focus of the current identity literature, together with the rather loose application of the term “identity”, leaves some observers sceptical about the validity and utility of identity as an analytical concept. With this backdrop, the article seeks to articulate an essential mechanism by which identity functions as a source of a state's foreign policy: A concept of state identity generates a specific value (a pro attitude toward a certain kind of action), which in turn determines a state's preference for a particular foreign policy option. This causal mechanism is then demonstrated by the empirical analysis of Japan's foreign policy toward post‐Cold War regional institution‐building. Further, by placing the identity mechanism within the value‐action framework of general foreign policy, the study raises concern about the conditions by which identity becomes a prominent factor, that is to say when identity matters. Along this line, the study highlights the context‐dependent and versatile natures of identity's function, and therefore, it cautions against overly deterministic approaches toward the role of identity in foreign policy and international relations.

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Japan has been a principal player in international assistance to Afghanistan, ranked second only to the United States in its overall financial assistance disbursed since 2002. This article places a spotlight on the largely underappreciated subject of Japan's primarily non-military and economic infrastructure-oriented assistance by articulating three major characteristics of Japan's policies and practices in Afghanistan-relatively large disbursements for reconstruction programmes, designating disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration as Japan's niche area, and substantial reliance on international organisations for fund disbursement. Despite its comparatively advantageous position vis-à-vis other donors, Japan has faced a set of institutional and structural impediments to carrying out effective stabilisation and reconstruction assistance, not just in Afghanistan, but also in other conflictprone and fragile societies. These include, among other things, the shortage of expertise, bureaucratic pressure for 'cash burning', inter-agency coordination problems, and waning political interest. As a result, this article argues that Japan has been underequipped to provide peacebuilding assistance on the large scale it committed in Afghanistan. If Tokyo hopes to safeguard its major investments in Afghanistan, it needs to revive the substantive political leadership it exercised in the early years of Afghan peacebuilding.

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