The interactions between the mother/parents and their offspring provides socioemotional input, which is essential for the establishment and maintenance of synaptic networks in prefrontal and limbic brain regions. Since glial cells are known to play an important role in developmental and experience-driven synaptic plasticity, the effect of an early adverse emotional experience induced by maternal separation for 1 or 6 h on the expression of the glia specific proteins S100beta and glial fibrillary acidic protein (GFAP) was quantitatively analyzed in anterior cingulate cortex, hippocampus, and precentral medial cortex. Three animal groups were analyzed at postnatal day 14: (i) separated for 1 h; (ii) separated for 6 h; (iii) undisturbed (control). Twenty-four hours after stress exposure, the stressed brains showed significantly reduced numbers of S100beta-immunoreactive (ir) cells in the anterior cingulate cortex (6-h stress) and in the precentral medial cortex (1- and 6-h stress). Significantly reduced numbers of GFAP-ir cells were observed only in the medial precentral cortex (1- and 6-h stress); no significant changes were observed in the anterior cingulate cortex. No significant changes of the two glial markers were observed in the hippocampus. Double-labeling experiments with GFAP and pCREB revealed pCREB labeling only in the hippocampus, where the stressed brains (1 and 6 h) displayed significantly reduced numbers of GFAP/pCREB-ir glial cells. The observed downregulation of glia-specific marker proteins is in line with our hypothesis that emotional experience can alter glia cell activation in the juvenile limbic system.

No abstract

In recent years there has been increasing evidence that an area in the brain called the cortical midline structures (CMSs) is implicated in what has been termed self-related processing. This article will discuss recent evidence for the relation between CMS and self-consciousness in light of several important philosophical distinctions. First, we should distinguish between being a self (i.e., being a subject of conscious experience) and being aware of being a self (i.e., being able to think about oneself as such). While the former consists in having a first-person perspective on the world, the latter requires the ability to explicitly represent one’s own perspective as such. Further, we should distinguish between being aware of oneself “as subject” and being aware of oneself “as object.” The focus of existing studies investigating the relation between CMS and self has been predominantly on the ability to think about oneself (and in particular thinking of oneself “as object”), while the more basic aspects involved in being a self have been neglected. However, it is important to widen the scope of the cognitive neuroscience to include the latter, not least because this might have important implications for a better understanding of disorders of the self, such as those involved in schizophrenia. In order to do so, cognitive neuroscience should work together with philosophy, including phenomenology. Second, we need to distinguish between personal and subpersonal level explanations. It will be argued that although it is important to respect this distinction, in principle, some subpersonal facts can enter into constitutive conditions of personal-level phenomena. However, in order for this to be possible, one needs both careful conceptual analysis and knowledge about relevant cognitive mechanisms.

Findings from neuroimaging are increasingly being cited in policy debates to strengthen the case for early identification of, and intervention with, children at risk of maltreatment and poor outcomes. While agreeing that neuroscientific research into the risks of maltreatment is a very valuable and exciting area of study, this article challenges the confidence with which these findings are used in policy discussions. It critically discusses the reliability and validity of the relevant findings and the contribution they can currently make to our understanding of the causes and consequences of maltreatment. In addition, it is argued that this type of evidence, which is new in policy debates, is often being used in ways that are problematic.Many participants in the relevant policy debates seem to subscribe either to an implicit version of dualism about the relationship between the mind and the body, or to reductionism -the view that the mental can be reduced to the physical. Such assumptions threaten the way we think about human agency and moral responsibility but it is argued that they are misguided for conceptual reasons. It is concluded that neuroscience has the potential to contribute to our understanding of the causes and effects of maltreatment but cannot do so in isolation from the social sciences.

No abstract