Citizens' welfare opinions are highly susceptible to cues about welfare recipients' deservingness. Extant research argues that this deservingness heuristic is a universal feature of human help-giving psychology, implying that all citizens, regardless of their values, are evenly affected by deservingness cues. This article suggests that the deservingness heuristic is much more conditional than previously appreciated. Specifically, its influence on welfare opinions is conditioned by humanitarianism: the belief that others in need should be helped. The more people adhere to this value, the more they need information that signals whether others are genuinely needy. Citizens should thus rely more on the deservingness heuristic the stronger their humanitarian values are. I find support for this argument in three survey experiments (two nationally representative), where citizens are exposed to cues that welfare recipients are either lazy (undeserving) or unlucky (deserving). These findings have important implications for our understanding of citizens' welfare opinions.

Public administration researchers have found that unfavorable state actions can trigger negative emotions in citizens, but the behavioral consequences of these emotions have been understudied. We draw on psychological insights to predict how discrete emotional responses to unfavorable interactions with the state (specifically: administrative decisions to deny access to public benefits) will predict citizens’ coping behaviors, such as whether they voice grievances, file complaints, and seek information. We test our hypotheses using a survey of applicants of a notoriously burdensome, means-tested tuition-free college program in Oklahoma, USA. In line with our theoretical framework, we find anger increases opposition behaviors in reaction to losses of access to the program, whereas shame reduces opposition among citizens. We also find that fear increases information-seeking and resistance behaviors. The results demonstrate the role of discrete emotions in predicting state-directed citizen behaviors, but also provide the groundwork for applying the discrete emotions framework to other actors, such as public managers and street-level bureaucrats.

Research on public opinion about economic redistribution has made important progress by incorporating the psychological microfoundation that shapes support for redistribution to the poor. However, one piece is missing: the microfoundation shaping support for redistribution from the rich. I provide a novel theory about this facet of redistributive attitudes and how it is distinct. Observational data from three nationally representative samples in two different welfare systems and an experiment show that attitudes about taking from the rich are mainly driven by perceptions of their prosociality—whether they are greedy or generous. This contrasts with public opinion about giving to the poor that is mainly driven by perceptions of the efforts of poor people. Furthermore, while compassion shapes attitudes about giving to the poor, the emotions of admiration and envy shape attitudes about taking from the rich. These findings have important theoretical and empirical implications for public opinion about economic redistribution.

Emotions are often seen as problematic in a democratic society where rationality should apparently rule. However, emotions are inevitable in politics, because politics is about people, and all human decision making is based on emotions. This article gives an introduction to research in emotions in politics, which is progressing rapidly. The article discusses what emotions are and gives an overview of the functions of specific emotions, e.g., anger, compassion and fear, as well as their consequences for political behavior. Finally, the article highlights six widespread misunderstandings and lists six principles for understanding the link between emotions and politics.

A key claim in the study of emotions is that anger makes people less responsive to risks, whereas fear makes people more responsive. Although risk is a fundamental concern in the area of military conflict, no studies have directly tested whether anger and fear moderate the impact of risk on public support for war. We test this key claim with casualty risks as our case. Across five experiments (N = 4,559), utilizing well-established treatment material to vary casualty risk and induce emotions, we replicate the central finding that higher casualty risk decreases support for war. Emotions, however, do not moderate the effect of risk. These findings, combined with limitations in existing research, raise debate about the empirical robustness of the prominent emotion–risk interaction as well as widely used emotion inductions.