No abstract
We study the problem of automatically and efficiently generating itineraries for users who are on vacation. We focus on the common case, wherein the trip duration is more than a single day. Previous efficient algorithms based on greedy heuristics suffer from two problems. First, the itineraries are often unbalanced, with excellent days visiting top attractions followed by days of exclusively lower-quality alternatives. Second, the trips often re-visit neighborhoods repeatedly in order to cover increasingly low-tier points of interest. Our primary technical contribution is an algorithm that addresses both these problems by maximizing the quality of the worst day. We give theoretical results showing that this algorithm's competitive factor is within a factor two of the guarantee of the best available algorithm for a single day, across many variations of the problem. We also give detailed empirical evaluations using two distinct datasets: (a) anonymized Google historical visit data and (b) Foursquare public check-in data. We show first that the overall utility of our itineraries is almost identical to that of algorithms specifically designed to maximize total utility, while the utility of the worst day of our itineraries is roughly twice that obtained from other approaches. We then turn to evaluation based on human raters who score our itineraries only slightly below the itineraries created by human travel experts with deep knowledge of the area.
Recent years have witnessed the rise of many successful e-commerce marketplace platforms like the Amazon marketplace, AirBnB, Uber/Lyft, and Upwork, where a central platform mediates economic transactions between buyers and sellers. A common feature of many of these two-sided marketplaces is that the platform has full control over search and discovery, but prices are determined by the buyers and sellers. We summarize our results from [Banerjee et al. 2017] where, motivated by this application domain, we study the algorithmic aspects of market segmentation via directed discovery in two-sided markets with endogenous prices. We consider a model where an online platform knows each buyer/seller's characteristics, and associated demand/supply elasticities. Moreover, the platform can use discovery mechanisms (search, recommendation, etc.) to control which buyers/sellers are visible to each other. We develop efficient algorithms for throughput (i.e. volume of trade) and welfare maximization with provable guarantees under a variety of assumptions on the demand and supply functions.
In recent years, a range of online applications have facilitated resource sharing among users, resulting in a significant increase in resource utilization. In all such applications, sharing one’s resources or skills with other agents increases social welfare. In general, each agent will look for other agents whose available resources complement hers, thereby forming natural sharing groups. In this paper, we study settings where a large population self-organizes into sharing groups. In many cases, centralized optimization approaches for creating an optimal partition of the user population are infeasible because either the central authority does not have the necessary information to compute an optimal partition, or it does not have the power to enforce a partition. Instead, the central authority puts in place an incentive structure in the form of a utility sharing method, before letting the participants form the sharing groups by themselves. We first analyze a simple equal-sharing method, which is the one most typically encountered in practice and show that it can lead to highly inefficient equilibria. We then propose a Shapley-sharing method and show that it significantly improves overall social welfare.
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