In the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, public health experts have produced guidelines to limit the spread of the coronavirus, but individuals do not always comply with experts’ recommendations. Here, we tested whether a specific psychological belief—identification with all humanity—predicts cooperation with public health guidelines as well as helpful behavior during the COVID-19 pandemic. We hypothesized that peoples’ endorsement of this belief—their relative perception of a connection and moral commitment to other humans—would predict their tendencies to adopt World Health Organization (WHO) guidelines and to help others. To assess this, we conducted a global online study (N = 2537 participants) of four WHO-recommended health behaviors and four pandemic-related moral dilemmas that we constructed to be relevant to helping others at a potential cost to oneself. We used generalized linear mixed models (GLMM) that included 10 predictor variables (demographic, contextual, and psychological) for each of five outcome measures (a WHO cooperative health behavior score, plus responses to each of our four moral, helping dilemmas). Identification with all humanity was the most consistent and consequential predictor of individuals’ cooperative health behavior and helpful responding. Analyses showed that the identification with all humanity significantly predicted each of the five outcomes while controlling for the other variables (Prange < 10−22 to < 0.009). The mean effect size of the identification with all humanity predictor on these outcomes was more than twice as large as the effect sizes of other predictors. Identification with all humanity is a psychological construct that, through targeted interventions, may help scientists and policymakers to better understand and promote cooperative health behavior and help-oriented concern for others during the current pandemic as well as in future humanitarian crises.

To make decisions in a social context, humans have to predict the behavior of others, an ability that is thought to rely on having a model of other minds known as "theory of mind." Such a model becomes especially complex when the number of people one simultaneously interacts with is large and actions are anonymous. Here, we present results from a group decision-making task known as the volunteer's dilemma and demonstrate that a Bayesian model based on partially observable Markov decision processes outperforms existing models in quantitatively predicting human behavior and outcomes of group interactions. Our results suggest that in decision-making tasks involving large groups with anonymous members, humans use Bayesian inference to model the "mind of the group," making predictions of others' decisions while also simulating the effects of their own actions on the group's dynamics in the future.

In perceptual decisions, subjects infer hidden states of the environment based on noisy sensory information. Here we show that both choice and its associated confidence are explained by a Bayesian framework based on partially observable Markov decision processes (POMDPs). We test our model on monkeys performing a direction-discrimination task with post-decision wagering, demonstrating that the model explains objective accuracy and predicts subjective confidence. Further, we show that the model replicates well-known discrepancies of confidence and accuracy, including the hard-easy effect, opposing effects of stimulus variability on confidence and accuracy, dependence of confidence ratings on simultaneous or sequential reports of choice and confidence, apparent difference between choice and confidence sensitivity, and seemingly disproportionate influence of choice-congruent evidence on confidence. These effects may not be signatures of sub-optimal inference or discrepant computational processes for choice and confidence. Rather, they arise in Bayesian inference with incomplete knowledge of the environment.

In perceptual decisions, subjects infer hidden states of the environment based on noisy sensory information. Here we show that both choice and its associated confidence are explained by a Bayesian framework based on partially observable Markov decision processes (POMDPs). We test our model on monkeys performing a direction-discrimination task with post-decision wagering, demonstrating that the model explains objective accuracy and predicts subjective confidence. Further, we show that the model replicates well-known discrepancies of confidence and accuracy, including the hard-easy effect, opposing effects of stimulus volatility on confidence and accuracy, dependence of confidence ratings on simultaneous or sequential reports of choice and confidence, apparent difference between choice and confidence sensitivity, and seemingly disproportionate influence of choice-congruent evidence on confidence. These effects may not be signatures of sub-optimal inference or discrepant computational processes for choice and confidence. Rather, they arise in Bayesian inference with incomplete knowledge of the environment.

To make decisions in a social context, humans have to predict the behavior of others, an ability that is thought to rely on having a model of other minds known as theory of mind. Such a model becomes especially complex when the number of people one simultaneously interacts is large and the actions are anonymous. Here, we show that in order to make decisions within a large group, humans employ Bayesian inference to model the "mind of the group," making predictions of others' decisions while also considering the effects of their own actions on the group as a whole. We present results from a group decision making task known as the Volunteers Dilemma and demonstrate that a Bayesian model based on partially observable Markov decision processes outperforms existing models in quantitatively explaining human behavior. Our results suggest that in group decision making, rather than acting based solely on the rewards received thus far, humans maintain a model of the group and simulate the group's dynamics into the future in order to choose an action as a member of the group.

Abstract-We propose a novel method for solving the localization problem, particularly useful in self-similar environments. Localization is the task of determining a robot's position with little or no prior knowledge about its initial location. We introduce a computationally efficient active strategy for the localization task. The proposed method also automatically generates optimal macro actions giving the robot the ability to localize in all environments. Combining the active strategy and macro actions, the method introduces an efficient strategy for determining a robot's position in any environment where localization is possible.

POMDP (Partially Observable Markov Decision Process) is a mathematical framework that models planning under uncertainty. Solving a POMDP is an intractable problem and even the state of the art POMDP solvers are too computationally expensive for large domains. This is a major bottleneck. In this paper, we propose a new heuristic, called the pairwise heuristic, that can be used in a one-step greedy strategy to find a near optimal solution for POMDP problems very quickly. This approach is a good candidate for large problems where real-time solution is a necessity but exact optimality of the solution is not vital. The pairwise heuristic uses the optimal solutions for pairs of states. For each pair of states in the POMDP, we find the optimal sequence of actions to resolve the uncertainty and to maximize the reward, given that the agent is uncertain about which state of the pair it is in. Then we use these sequences as a heuristic and find the optimal action in each step of the greedy strategy using this heuristic. We have tested our method on the available large classical test benchmarks in various domains. The resulting total reward is close to, if not greater than, the total reward obtained by other state of the art POMDP solvers, while the time required to find the solution is always much less.

Humans frequently interact with other agents whose intentions can fluctuate over time between competitive and cooperative strategies. How does the brain decide whether the others’ intentions are to cooperate or compete when the nature of the interactions is not explicitly signaled? We used model-based fMRI and a task in which participants thought they were playing with another player. In fact, this agent was an algorithm alternating without signaling between cooperative and competitive strategies. A neurocomputational mechanism underlying arbitration between competitive and cooperative experts outperforms other learning models in predicting choice behavior. The ventral striatum and ventromedial prefrontal cortex tracked the reliability of this arbitration process. When attributing competitive intentions, these regions increased their coupling with a network that distinguish prediction error related to competition versus cooperation. These findings provide a neurocomputational account of how the brain dynamically arbitrates between cooperative and competitive intentions when making adaptive social decisions.