Human choice behavior exhibits many paradoxical and challenging patterns. Traditional explanations focus on how values are represented, but little is known about how values are integrated. Here we outline a psychophysical task for value integration that can be used as a window on high-level, multiattribute decisions. Participants choose between alternative rapidly presented streams of numerical values. By controlling the temporal distribution of the values, we demonstrate that this process underlies many puzzling choice paradoxes, such as temporal, risk, and framing biases, as well as preference reversals. These phenomena can be explained by a simple mechanism based on the integration of values, weighted by their salience. The salience of a sampled value depends on its temporal order and momentary rank in the decision context, whereas the direction of the weighting is determined by the task framing. We show that many known choice anomalies may arise from the microstructure of the value integration process. decision making | decoy effects | value psychophysics | expanded judgement R ecent research on the psychology and neuroscience of simple, evidence-based choices (e.g., integrating perceptual or reward information) has made impressive progress, leading to the conclusion that the brain is optimized to make the fastest decision for a specified accuracy (1-5). Accordingly, the observer is assumed to infer the most probable cause of a perceived experience by sequentially accumulating samples of noisy evidence until a response criterion is reached. The idea that simple, evidence-based decision making is optimal contrasts with findings in more complex, motivation-based decisions, focused on multiple goals with tradeoffs (e.g., choices among cars or flats). Here, a number of paradoxical and puzzling choice behaviors (6-8) have been revealed, posing a serious challenge to the development of a unified theory of choice.Can a common theoretical framework between evidence-based and motivation-based decisions be established? A natural starting point is to propose that, in the latter, the cognitive system integrates subjective values (rather than, say, pieces of perceptual evidence), that depend on how each alternative matches the decision maker's goals (9). In particular, when alternatives are characterized by different attributes (e.g., product price and quality), preference is shaped through shifting attention across these attributes (8, 10), assessing an item's subjective value on each attribute, integrating these values across time, and finally making a choice when some threshold is reached (11-13). A detailed understanding of these computations might explain the systematic anomalies observed in motivation-based decisions.This line of research has been difficult to pursue, however, because classical laboratory preference tasks provide little control of the moment-by-moment processes of value sampling and integration. This stands in contrast with psychophysical paradigms for studying evidence-based perceptual choice wher...
Neural systems adapt to background levels of stimulation. Adaptive gain control has been extensively studied in sensory systems but overlooked in decision-theoretic models. Here, we describe evidence for adaptive gain control during the serial integration of decision-relevant information. Human observers judged the average information provided by a rapid stream of visual events (samples). The impact that each sample wielded over choices depended on its consistency with the previous sample, with more consistent or expected samples wielding the greatest influence over choice. This bias was also visible in the encoding of decision information in pupillometric signals and in cortical responses measured with functional neuroimaging. These data can be accounted for with a serial sampling model in which the gain of information processing adapts rapidly to reflect the average of the available evidence.
According to normative theories, reward-maximizing agents should have consistent preferences. Thus, when faced with alternatives A, B, and C, an individual preferring A to B and B to C should prefer A to C. However, it has been widely argued that humans can incur losses by violating this axiom of transitivity, despite strong evolutionary pressure for reward-maximizing choices. Here, adopting a biologically plausible computational framework, we show that intransitive (and thus economically irrational) choices paradoxically improve accuracy (and subsequent economic rewards) when decision formation is corrupted by internal neural noise. Over three experiments, we show that humans accumulate evidence over time using a "selective integration" policy that discards information about alternatives with momentarily lower value. This policy predicts violations of the axiom of transitivity when three equally valued alternatives differ circularly in their number of winning samples. We confirm this prediction in a fourth experiment reporting significant violations of weak stochastic transitivity in human observers. Crucially, we show that relying on selective integration protects choices against "late" noise that otherwise corrupts decision formation beyond the sensory stage. Indeed, we report that individuals with higher late noise relied more strongly on selective integration. These findings suggest that violations of rational choice theory reflect adaptive computations that have evolved in response to irreducible noise during neural information processing.decision making | irrationality | choice optimality | selective integration | evidence accumulation D aily decisions, such as choosing a holiday destination or accepting a job offer, involve comparing alternatives that are characterized by different attributes (1, 2). Understanding how the brain combines information from different attributes into unitary decision values is a key challenge in psychology and the neurosciences (3, 4). From a normative perspective, the value of an alternative should be independent of factors, such as the attractiveness of competing alternatives or the context in which preferences are elicited (5). Thus, the preference relationship between two alternatives ought to remain stable, regardless of changes to the choice set, incurred for example by the addition or removal of other choice alternatives (6).However, human preferences are often driven by irrelevant factors (7,8). For instance, an initial preference for one holiday destination (e.g., Bali) over another (e.g., Berlin) can reverse when an inferior alternative (e.g., Dresden) is added to the choice set, even if this "decoy" alternative is never chosen (9, 10). Similarly, an individual preferring a holiday in Bali to Berlin, and Berlin to Boston, will sometimes show a systematic "intransitive" (or inconsistent) preference for Boston over Bali (11). A canonical argument states that such violations of decision theory (hereafter "economic" or "choice irrationality") disclose fundamental limita...
People's assessments of the state of the world often deviate systematically from the information available to them [1]. Such biases can originate from people's own decisions: committing to a categorical proposition, or a course of action, biases subsequent judgment and decision-making. This phenomenon, called confirmation bias [2], has been explained as suppression of post-decisional dissonance [3, 4]. Here, we provide insights into the underlying mechanism. It is commonly held that decisions result from the accumulation of samples of evidence informing about the state of the world [5-8]. We hypothesized that choices bias the accumulation process by selectively altering the weighting (gain) of subsequent evidence, akin to selective attention. We developed a novel psychophysical task to test this idea. Participants viewed two successive random dot motion stimuli and made two motion-direction judgments: a categorical discrimination after the first stimulus and a continuous estimation of the overall direction across both stimuli after the second stimulus. Participants' sensitivity for the second stimulus was selectively enhanced when that stimulus was consistent with the initial choice (compared to both, first stimuli and choice-inconsistent second stimuli). A model entailing choice-dependent selective gain modulation explained this effect better than several alternative mechanisms. Choice-dependent gain modulation was also established in another task entailing averaging of numerical values instead of motion directions. We conclude that intermittent choices direct selective attention during the evaluation of subsequent evidence, possibly due to decision-related feedback in the brain [9]. Our results point to a recurrent interplay between decision-making and selective attention.
In accounting for phenomena present in preferential choice experiments, modern models assume a wide array of different mechanisms such as lateral inhibition, leakage, loss aversion, and saliency. These mechanisms create interesting predictions for the dynamics of the deliberation process as well as the aggregate behavior of preferential choice in a variety of contexts. However, the models that embody these different mechanisms are rarely subjected to rigorous quantitative tests of suitability by way of model fitting and evaluation. Recently, complex, stochastic models have been cast aside in favor of simpler approximations, which may or may not capture the data as well. In this article, we use a recently developed method to fit the four extant models of context effects to data from two experiments: one involving consumer goods stimuli, and another involving perceptual stimuli. Our third study investigates the relative merits of the mechanisms currently assumed by the extant models of context effects by testing every possible configuration of mechanism within one overarching model. Across all tasks, our results emphasize the importance of several mechanisms such as lateral inhibition, loss aversion, and pairwise attribute differences, as these mechanisms contribute positively to model performance. Together, our results highlight the notion that mathematical tractability, while certainly a convenient feature of any model, should neither be the primary impetus for model development nor the promoting or demotion of specific model mechanisms. Instead, model fit, balanced with model complexity, should be the greatest burden to bear for any theoretical account of empirical phenomena. (PsycINFO Database Record
A key computation underlying perceptual decisions is the temporal integration of "evidence" in favor of different states of the world. Studies from psychology and neuroscience have shown that observers integrate multiple samples of noisy perceptual evidence over time toward a decision. An influential model posits perfect evidence integration (i.e., without forgetting), enabling optimal decisions based on stationary evidence. However, in real-life environments, the perceptual evidence typically changes continuously. We used a computational model to show that, under such conditions, performance can be improved by means of leaky (forgetful) integration, if the integration timescale is adapted toward the predominant signal duration. We then tested whether human observers employ such an adaptive integration process. Observers had to detect visual luminance "signals" of variable strength, duration, and onset latency, embedded within longer streams of noise. Different sessions entailed predominantly short or long signals. The rate of performance improvement as a function of signal duration indicated that observers indeed changed their integration timescale with the predominant signal duration, in accordance with the adaptive integration account. Our findings establish that leaky integration of perceptual evidence is flexible and that cognitive control mechanisms can exploit this flexibility for optimizing the decision process.
When people make decisions, do they give equal weight to evidence arriving at different times? A recent study (Kiani et al., 2008) using brief motion pulses (superimposed on a random moving dot display) reported a primacy effect: pulses presented early in a motion observation period had a stronger impact than pulses presented later. This observation was interpreted as supporting the bounded diffusion (BD) model and ruling out models in which evidence accumulation is subject to leakage or decay of early-arriving information. We use motion pulses and other manipulations of the timing of the perceptual evidence in new experiments and simulations that support the leaky competing accumulator (LCA) model as an alternative to the BD model. While the LCA does include leakage, we show that it can exhibit primacy as a result of competition between alternatives (implemented via mutual inhibition), when the inhibition is strong relative to the leak. Our experiments replicate the primacy effect when participants must be prepared to respond quickly at the end of a motion observation period. With less time pressure, however, the primacy effect is much weaker. For 2 (out of 10) participants, a primacy bias observed in trials where the motion observation period is short becomes weaker or reverses (becoming a recency effect) as the observation period lengthens. Our simulation studies show that primacy is equally consistent with the LCA or with BD. The transition from primacy-to-recency can also be captured by the LCA but not by BD. Individual differences and relations between the LCA and other models are discussed.
Perceptual choices depend not only on the current sensory input but also on the behavioral context, such as the history of one’s own choices. Yet, it remains unknown how such history signals shape the dynamics of later decision formation. In models of decision formation, it is commonly assumed that choice history shifts the starting point of accumulation toward the bound reflecting the previous choice. We here present results that challenge this idea. We fit bounded-accumulation decision models to human perceptual choice data, and estimated bias parameters that depended on observers’ previous choices. Across multiple task protocols and sensory modalities, individual history biases in overt behavior were consistently explained by a history-dependent change in the evidence accumulation, rather than in its starting point. Choice history signals thus seem to bias the interpretation of current sensory input, akin to shifting endogenous attention toward (or away from) the previously selected interpretation.
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